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PACKAGE BOMBS, FOOTLOCKERS, AND
LAPTOPS: WHAT THE DISAPPEARING
CONTAINER DOCTRINE CAN TELL US
ABOUT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
CYNTHIA LEE *
In the 1970s, the Court announced in a series of cases that police
officers with probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of a crime is
within a container must obtain a warrant from a neutral, detached judicial
officer before searching that container. In requiring a search warrant, the
Container Doctrine put portable containers on an almost equal footing with
houses, which enjoy unquestioned Fourth Amendment protection.
This Article demonstrates that the Container Doctrine is fast becoming
a historical relic as the Court expands the ways in which law enforcement
officers can search containers without first obtaining a warrant issued by a
judicial officer. Studying the numerous ways in which the Court has
undermined the Container Doctrine is useful for several reasons. First, the
erosion of the Container Doctrine is emblematic of a more tectonic
jurisprudential shift—the Court’s movement away from the Warrant
*
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Preference view (the belief that the Fourth Amendment expresses a
preference for warrants) and its gradual embrace of the Separate Clauses
(or Reasonableness) view of the Fourth Amendment. Second, the Court’s
willingness to allow a growing number of container searches without
warrants suggests a deep judicial ambivalence about the effectiveness of
warrant formalism. Third, the demise of the Container Doctrine, and its
corresponding impact on the poor and homeless, reflects a troubling
indifference to non-majoritarian interests.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II examines the longstanding
debate over whether the Fourth Amendment expresses a preference for
warrants or merely requires that searches and seizures not be
unreasonable. Part III provides background on the Container Doctrine and
discusses its rationales. Part IV examines the myriad ways in which police
can lawfully search a container without a warrant. The Court’s increasing
willingness to tolerate warrantless searches of containers mirrors its
gradual embrace of the Separate Clauses or Reasonableness view of the
Fourth Amendment, the position that all the Fourth Amendment requires is
that searches and seizures be reasonable. Part V provides a discussion of
why this movement away from warrants towards reasonableness in the
container search context is problematic and what might be done about the
situation. This Article argues that not requiring warrants for most
container searches hurts the poor and, by implication, poor communities of
color, more so than the wealthy. To rectify this unfairness, this Article
proposes an additional layer of review in container search cases where the
government claims the warrantless search falls within an exception to the
warrant requirement. Borrowing from a small slice of the Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence, its “rational basis with bite” cases, this Article
proposes that courts be non-deferential and rigorous when engaging in
reasonableness review. In other words, reviewing courts should employ
reasonableness review “with teeth.”
I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2010, two packages mailed from Yemen and addressed to
Jewish synagogues in Chicago were intercepted and found to contain
explosive material.1 One of the package bombs was found on a UPS plane
that had stopped in England. 2 The other bomb, hidden inside a printer
cartridge, was intercepted at a FedEx facility in Dubai.3 Earlier in October,
1

Peter Finn, Greg Miller, & Anne E. Kornblut, Two Packages Sent from Yemen Held
Explosives, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2010, at A1.
2
Id.
3
Peter Finn & Mary Beth Sheridan, Bomb’s Ingredients Point to Saudi Terrorist, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 31, 2010, at A5.
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Farooque Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, was arrested for
conspiring to blow up Metrorail stations in the Washington, D.C. area.4
Unattended backpacks and duffel bags on city streets in Washington, D.C.
lead to mass evacuations and street closures as authorities seek to make sure
the seemingly abandoned containers do not contain explosives. 5
We live in a time of heightened security. After the September 11,
2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the 2004 train
bombings in Madrid, Spain, the 2005 attacks on the London transit system,
the 2008 bombing attacks in Mumbai, India, the attempted bombing of a
Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit by a Nigerian citizen
with plastic explosives hidden in his underwear on December 25, 2009 (the
attempted Christmas Day bombing), and the car bomb found in New York’s
Times Square in May 2010, the threat of another terrorist attack is a very
real concern. The desire to give government officials the ability to prevent
the loss of human life from such an attack is completely understandable.
In light of valid security concerns, one might wonder why anyone
should care about an almost forgotten doctrine that protects portable
containers from warrantless governmental searches. In a series of cases in
the 1970s, the Court announced, in a rule I call the Container Doctrine, that
police officers with probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of a
crime is within a container may seize the container, but cannot open and
search it without first obtaining a warrant from a neutral, detached judicial
officer. 6 Over the ensuing years, the Court has gradually eroded the
Container Doctrine, allowing police officers to search portable containers
without a warrant under a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement.
In this Article, I demonstrate that the Container Doctrine is fast
becoming a historical relic as the Court expands the ways in which law
enforcement officers can search containers without first obtaining a warrant
issued by a judicial officer. Studying the numerous ways in which the
Court has undermined the Container Doctrine is useful for several reasons.
First, the erosion of the Container Doctrine is emblematic of a more
tectonic jurisprudential shift—the Court’s movement away from the
Warrant Preference view (the belief that the Fourth Amendment expresses a

4

Annie Gowen & Spencer S. Hsu, Terror Suspect’s Anger Stood Out, WASH. POST, Oct.
30, 2010, at B1.
5
Martin Well, Suspicious Bags Around NW Sound False Alarm, WASH. POST, Oct. 30,
2010, at B3; Rick Rojas, Suspicious Items Cause Disruptions in NW D.C., WASH. POST, July
1, 2010, at B5 (noting that a gray suitcase left near a construction zone and a contraption
made of pipe resulted in the closure of several blocks in Northwest D.C. to both pedestrian
and car traffic).
6
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763–64 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 15 (1977).
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preference for warrants) 7 and its gradual embrace of the Separate Clauses
(or Reasonableness) 8 view of the Fourth Amendment. Second, the Court’s
willingness to allow a growing number of container searches without
warrants suggests judicial ambivalence about the effectiveness of warrant
formalism.
Third, the demise of the Container Doctrine, and its
corresponding impact on the poor and homeless, reflects a troubling
indifference to non-majoritarian interests.
Why should we care about this erosion of Fourth Amendment
protection for portable containers? We should care because portable
containers, like houses, are repositories for highly personal and private
effects. As some have argued, in protecting expectations of privacy, the
Fourth Amendment protects a right to “control over knowledge about
oneself.” 9 What we keep in our purses, wallets, briefcases, and suitcases
can reveal a great deal about our lives. Government officials should not be
able to search our effects without a good reason. Those of us who use
laptops and smartphones should be concerned when the government starts
equating laptops and cellphones with other portable containers that can be
searched without a warrant, as it has at the international border.10
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part II, I examine the
longstanding debate over whether the text of the Fourth Amendment
expresses a preference for warrants or merely requires that searches and
seizures be reasonable. For much of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court supported the Warrant Preference view of the Fourth Amendment—
the view that the Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a warrant
before searching unless a clearly delineated exception to the warrant
requirement applies. In the last ten to twenty years, however, an
increasingly conservative Court has moved toward the Separate Clauses or
Reasonableness view of the Fourth Amendment, the view that all the Fourth
Amendment requires is reasonableness. 11

7

See infra text accompanying notes 15–20.
See infra text accompanying notes 29–31.
9
Michael D. Granston, Note, From Private Places to Private Activities: Toward a New
Fourth Amendment House for the Shelterless, 101 YALE L.J. 1305, 1322 (1992).
10
See infra Part IV.E. (discussing warrantless, suspicionless searches of laptop
computers and cell phones at the border).
11
While most scholars refer to this approach as the Reasonableness view of the Fourth
Amendment, I use the terms “Reasonableness” and “Separate Clauses” interchangeably
because proponents of this view see the Fourth Amendment as having two separate clauses.
They see the “and” in the middle of the Fourth Amendment as separating the two clauses of
the Fourth Amendment such that one clause requires reasonableness and the other merely
specifies the requirements for a valid warrant. They thus conclude that all the Fourth
Amendment requires is that searches and seizures not be unreasonable. See infra Part II.B.
8
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In Part III, I provide background on the Container Doctrine and
discuss its rationales. Born during the 1970s in the heyday of the Warrant
Preference view, the Container Doctrine reflects the understanding that it is
preferable to have a neutral and detached judicial officer, rather than a
police officer, make the probable cause determination. In requiring police
officers to obtain a warrant before searching a container, the Container
Doctrine not only reflected the Court’s embrace of the Warrant Preference
view, it also put portable containers used to carry personal effects on the
same footing as private homes, which as a general rule cannot be searched
without a warrant.
In Part IV, I examine the myriad ways in which police can lawfully
search a container without a warrant. Without formally abandoning the
Container Doctrine except in the context of automobile searches, the Court
has steadily eroded it by permitting police officers to search containers
without a warrant under various exceptions to the warrant requirement. The
Court’s increasing willingness to tolerate warrantless searches of containers
mirrors its gradual embrace of the Separate Clauses or Reasonableness view
of the Fourth Amendment. The Court’s path from warrant preference to
reasonableness, however, has not been straight or smooth. The Court has
flip-flopped over the years, at times embracing warrants and at other times
embracing reasonableness. As recently as 2009, the Court expressed strong
support for the Warrant Preference view. 12 Overall, however, the trajectory
has been away from requiring warrants in favor of mere reasonableness
review. This back-and-forth is also seen in the Court’s container search
cases.
In Part V, I discuss why the movement away from warrants towards
reasonableness in the container search context is problematic and what
might be done about the situation. I argue that reasonableness review, as
currently applied, tends to be too deferential to the government and wildly
indeterminate. I also argue that dispensing with warrants for container
searches disproportionately hurts the poor in general and poor communities
of color in particular.
To rectify these problems, I propose an additional layer of review in
container search cases. When the government claims that a warrantless
container search was justified by an exception to the warrant requirement,
in addition to determining whether the requirements of the exception have
for more detailed explanation of the Separate Clauses or Reasonableness view of the Fourth
Amendment.
12
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (“[S]earches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.”).
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been satisfied, the reviewing court must scrupulously evaluate the overall
reasonableness of the search. Reasonableness review comports with the
Fourth Amendment’s command that searches and seizures not be
unreasonable. The reasonableness review I propose, however, is not the
run-of-the-mill, ultra-deferential reasonableness review that courts currently
employ. Borrowing from a small slice of the Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence—its “rational basis with bite” cases—I propose that courts
employ non-deferential, rigorous reasonableness review. In other words, I
propose that reviewing courts employ reasonableness review with teeth.
While I believe the Warrant Preference view of the Fourth Amendment is
the view that most appropriately protects the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, I realize that the current Court is
unlikely to go back to a strong embrace of warrants anytime soon. 13
Therefore, even though I agree with much that critics of the Reasonableness
approach have to say, I make my argument within the Separate Clauses
framework in order to provide a pragmatic suggestion for protecting privacy
interests in containers.
II. WARRANTS OR REASONABLENESS: THE DEBATE OVER THE MEANING OF
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. 14

For years, legal scholars and Supreme Court Justices have debated the
meaning of these words. Over time, two competing interpretations of the
13
Tellingly, Justice Stevens, who retired from the Supreme Court in June 2010, authored
the only two decisions between 2000 and the drafting of this Article in which the Court
explicitly embraced the Warrant Preference view, and one of these cases involved the
warrantless search of a home where warrantless searches have traditionally been viewed with
suspicion. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716 (“Consistent with our precedent, our analysis begins,
as it should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, with the
basic rule that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S.
551, 559 (2004) (“[O]ur cases have firmly established the ‘basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable. . . .”).
14
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Fourth Amendment have emerged: (1) the Warrant Preference view, and (2)
the Separate Clauses (or Reasonableness) view.
A. THE WARRANT PREFERENCE VIEW

Under the Warrant Preference view, police must obtain a warrant
based upon probable cause before conducting a search unless an exception
to the warrant requirement applies.15 Proponents of the Warrant Preference
see the two clauses within the Fourth Amendment as interconnected, one
giving meaning to the other. 16 Thus, under this approach, whether a search
is reasonable turns on whether police went to a judicial officer before the
search to obtain a search warrant. Under the Warrant Preference view, a
search warrant is generally required unless a specifically delineated
exception to the warrant requirement applies.17
Adherents of the Warrant Preference view emphasize the importance
of having a neutral, detached judicial officer make the probable cause
15
See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 349, 396–97 (1974) (“[T]he principal check designed against the arbitrary discretion
of executive officers to search and seize was the requirement of a ‘search warrant exacting in
its foundation and limited in scope’; and consequently . . . a search is ‘unreasonable’ unless a
warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity.”); Tracey
Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV.
925, 928 (1997) (noting that the Warrant Preference view “posits that police must ordinarily
obtain a warrant prior to an intrusion, unless compelling reasons exist for proceeding without
one”); George C. Thomas III, Remapping the Criminal Procedure Universe, 83 VA. L. REV.
1819, 1833 (1997) (defending the Warrant Preference view on doctrinal and historical
grounds); see also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“When the Fourth Amendment outlawed ‘unreasonable searches’ and then went
on to define the very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate
could give, the framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is
‘unreasonable’ unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute
necessity.”); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 162 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(“[W]ith minor and severely confined exceptions, inferentially a part of the Amendment,
every search and seizure is unreasonable when made without a magistrate’s authority
expressed through a validly issued warrant.”). David Steinberg, in contrast, argues that the
Warrant Preference view is not supported by historical sources and that the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment sought to require warrants only for entries into the home, not other
places. David E. Steinberg, An Original Misunderstanding: Akhil Amar and Fourth
Amendment History, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 227, 264–65 (2005).
16
Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 197, 203 (1993) (noting that those who favor the Warrant Preference view contend that
“the Warrant Clause modifies the first clause—a reasonable search depends on the
authorization of a valid warrant”).
17
See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716 (“Consistent with our precedent, our analysis begins, as it
should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, with the basic
rule that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”).
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determination—the decision that there are reasonable grounds to believe
there is evidence of a crime in the place to be searched—rather than letting
the police officer make this determination. 18 Having a neutral judicial
officer conduct ex ante review of a police officer’s decision to search is
particularly important because the officer is not a neutral party in the war on
crime. In seeking to prevent and deter crime, the officer may see probable
cause when probable cause is lacking. Requiring a warrant in most cases
helps to constrain executive power, one of the key considerations that
motivated the Framers to include the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of
Rights. 19 For much of the twentieth century, the Court embraced the
Warrant Preference view of the Fourth Amendment. 20
18

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (“The judicial warrant . . . provides
the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against
improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer ‘engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”).
19
Maclin, supra note 15, at 970–71; see also Morgan Cloud, Pragamatism, Positivism,
and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 298 (1993) (noting that
“the model based upon the Warrant Clause does a better job of addressing the two
fundamental evils that concerned the Framers,” the evil of suspicionless searches and
seizures and excessive branch discretion).
20
See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 559 (1999) (“For most of [the twentieth] century, the Supreme Court has endorsed what
is now called the ‘warrant-preference’ construction of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, in
which the use of a valid warrant . . . is the salient feature in assessing the reasonableness of a
search or seizure.”); Maclin, supra note 16, at 204 (noting that “[t]he warrant preference
view grew in stature during the latter half of the 1960’s and the early 1970’s”); Scott E.
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry,
72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 386 (1988) (“Prior to Camara [decided in 1967], fourth amendment
analysis had a relatively high amount of predictability: the Court presumed that a warrant
based on probable cause was required before the police could perform a search or arrest.”);
James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close In on the Warrant
Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1124 (1992) (“For most of the twentieth century,
the Court has proclaimed its faith in the principle of neutral judicial screening of executive
decisions to search.”); see also Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716 (“Consistent with our precedent, our
analysis begins, as it should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless
search, with the basic rule that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.'”); Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999) (“A warrantless search by the
police is invalid unless it falls within one of the narrow and well-delineated exceptions to the
warrant requirement.”); Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (“The Fourth
Amendment generally requires police to secure a warrant before conducting a search.”);
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (“Time and again, this Court has
observed that searches and seizures conducted outside the warrant process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically and well delineated exceptions.”); United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (“Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, though
the Court has recognized a few limited exceptions to this general rule.”); United States v.
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In requiring law enforcement agents to obtain a warrant based on
probable cause before searching a container, the Container Doctrine situated
itself clearly with the Warrant Preference approach to the Fourth
Amendment. Requiring warrants for container searches was a bright line
rule that was simple for an officer in the field to apply. The Container
Doctrine also provided clear guidance to litigants and courts. Moreover,
because the Container Doctrine required an ex ante judicial determination
of probable cause, it had the advantage of interposing a neutral third party’s
judgment on top of the law enforcement agent’s determination that there
were sufficient grounds to justify opening the container and intruding upon
the container owner’s expectations of privacy. Ex ante review had the
further advantage of avoiding “the danger that the impartiality of a
subsequent evaluation [would] be compromised by the evidence uncovered
during the search in question.” 21
One problem with warrants is that simply requiring a warrant is often
not sufficiently protective of Fourth Amendment interests. As Yale
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981) (“It is a first
principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the police may not conduct a search
unless they first convince a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to do so.”);
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 9 (“The judicial warrant has a significant role to play [in determining
whether a search or seizure is reasonable] in that it provides the detached scrutiny of a
neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the
hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer ‘engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime.’”); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971)
(“[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.’”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.”).
21
Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the
Warrant Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 553 (1997);
see also Bryan D. Lammon, Note, The Practical Mandates of the Fourth Amendment: A
Behavioral Argument for the Exclusionary Rule and Warrant Preference, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1101 (2007) (arguing that requiring judges to determine the legality of a search in an ex
ante warrant proceeding results in more accurate determinations of legality than having
judges determine the lawfulness of a search through ex post reasonableness review). But see
Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie, & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1317
(2005) (finding no statistically significant difference between ex ante and ex post judicial
assessments of probable cause). Another advantage of the warrant process is that it protects
the innocent as well as the guilty. Lewis R. Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed:
The Rise of a Public Place Exemption to the Warrant Requirement, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
375, 384 (1986) (“Unlike the exclusionary rule, which initially offers rewards only to the
guilty, the warrant process offers its protection to innocent and guilty alike.”) (footnotes
omitted).
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Kamisar has noted, getting a warrant to search or arrest is “notoriously
easy.” 22 At some courthouses, magistrates spend less than one minute per
warrant application. 23 One study found that the average length of time a
magistrate spends reviewing a warrant application is two minutes and fortyeight seconds. 24
Not surprisingly, the vast majority of warrant applications are
approved. 25 Even in courthouses where some magistrates take their duties
seriously and subject warrant applications to more rigorous scrutiny, police
officers are able to get virtually all of their warrant applications approved
by engaging in magistrate shopping—seeking out magistrates who are
known to routinely issue warrants sought by the police.26 In one
jurisdiction, although any one of a number of magistrates can review and
issue search warrants, only a few magistrates end up handling the lion’s
share of search warrant applications because officers know which
magistrates are known for “being liberal in granting search warrants.” 27
Given the ease with which police officers can obtain a warrant, some
scholars have lamented that “[a] search warrant now generally offers little if
any protection against governmental invasions of private property and
serves primarily to obviate adversarial challenge to the government’s
claimed reason for searching.” 28

22

Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a “Principled
Basis” Rather Than an “Empirical Proposition”?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 570 (1983).
23
Id.
24
RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS,
PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES 31 (1984).
25
Kamisar, supra note 22, at 570 n.32. But see Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95
YALE L.J. 906, 923–30 (1986) (discussing empirical research on the search warrant process
showing that most warrants are successful in discovering at least some of the evidence
sought in the warrant application).
26
Paul Sutton, The Fourth Amendment in Action: An Empirical View of the Search
Warrant Process, 22 CRIM L. BULL. 405, 418–19 (1986) (stating that at least one person in
each of the seven jurisdictions studied told researchers, “There are some judges who will
sign anything”).
27
Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for Narcotics in San Diego:
Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 221,
227–28 (2000).
28
Ricardo J. Bascuas, Property and Probable Cause: The Fourth Amendment’s
Principled Protection of Privacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 575, 580 (2008); see also Christopher
Slobogin, An Empirically Based Comparison of American and European Regulatory
Approaches to Police Investigation, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 423, 430 (2001) (noting that only
five percent of warrants that are issued are subsequently found invalid).
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B. THE SEPARATE CLAUSES OR REASONABLENESS VIEW

Over the last two decades, the Supreme Court has increasingly
embraced the Separate Clauses or Reasonableness view of the Fourth
Amendment. 29 Proponents of the Separate Clauses view focus on the fact
that the text of the Fourth Amendment contains two clauses, separated by
the word “and.” The first clause (“The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated”) is the Reasonableness Clause, which directs
that all searches and seizures must be reasonable. The second clause (“and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized”) is the Warrant Clause, which specifies the
requirements for a valid warrant. Separate Clauses proponents see these
two clauses as separate and completely independent. Accordingly, under
the Separate Clauses view, the Fourth Amendment does not require or
express a preference for warrants. All the Fourth Amendment requires is
that searches and seizures be reasonable. 30 If a warrant is sought, it must be
29
See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[T]he ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness . . . .”) (internal quotation omitted);
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (“The touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined by
[balancing].”); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (“[The Fourth Amendment’s]
‘central requirement’ is one of reasonableness.”); Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 71
(1992) (“[R]easonableness is still the ultimate standard under the Fourth Amendment.”);
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all
state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.”).
30
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759
(1994) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment requires searches and seizures to be reasonable,
and that it does not require warrants, probable cause, nor the exclusion of evidence); see also
TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41 (1969) (“[O]ur
constitutional fathers were not concerned about warrantless searches, but about overreaching
warrants.”); Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Death of Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1275, 1280–
93 (2010) (arguing that reasonableness, not warrants nor suspicion, serves as the
constitutional touchstone for all governmental searches); Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches:
Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law History of Suspicion and Probable Cause,
10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 8 (2007) (finding arguments in favor of the Reasonableness
approach more persuasive than arguments in favor of the Warrant Preference approach). But
see Davies, supra note 20, at 736 (“The Framers never meant to create a relativistic notion of
‘reasonableness’ as a global standard for assessing warrantless intrusions by officers.”);
Maclin, supra note 16 (arguing that the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is a
distrust of police power and discretion, not reasonableness). For additional critiques of
Amar’s argument, see WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND
ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791, at 773–77 (2009) (arguing that Amar has misread or ignored
the available historical evidence); Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and
Constitutional Law: “Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559
(1996) (critiquing Amar’s approach to criminal procedure as historically and theoretically
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supported by probable cause, oath, or affirmation, and specify with
particularity the places to be searched and the items to be seized. 31
III. THE CONTAINER DOCTRINE
When one hears the word “container,” one usually thinks of portable
containers that can hold one’s personal belongings, such as suitcases,
backpacks, and purses. This also seems to be what the Supreme Court has
in mind when it uses the term in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.32
The Court, however, has defined the term “container” much more
expansively, providing that a container is “any object capable of holding
another object.” 33 Under this definition, a jacket with pockets is a container
because it is an object capable of holding other objects.34 Perhaps less
obviously, a house is a container under this definition, since it too is an
object capable of holding another object. A car is a container since it is an
object capable of holding another object. Even the human body can be
considered a container since the body, as drug smugglers and savvy inmates
know, is capable of holding or concealing various objects.
The Supreme Court’s broad definition of a container for Fourth
Amendment purposes has created an interesting paradox. On the one hand,
in keeping with the colloquial image of the container as a portable object
used to carry personal items, the Court has explicitly refused to draw a
distinction between worthy and unworthy containers, explaining that a
traveler with a paper bag containing a toothbrush and a few articles of
clothing has just as much a right to demand privacy from governmental
intrusion as a business executive with a locked attaché case.35 In other
words, the Court’s official policy is to treat all containers alike.

amiss); Maclin, supra note 15, at 929 (arguing that Amar provides an incomplete account of
the Fourth Amendment’s history); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles,
107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994) (arguing that our understanding of the Fourth Amendment
must change over time to accommodate circumstances that may not have been present at the
time the Bill of Rights was drafted); Steinberg, supra note 15, at 229 (arguing that Amar’s
position “receives little support from historical sources”); Thomas, supra note 15, at 1824–
40 (critiquing Amar’s suggestion that the Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses should be
read separately).
31
Arcila, supra note 30, at 1280 (arguing that the Framers included the Warrant Clause
in the Fourth Amendment not to create a presumptive warrant requirement but “to strictly
limit the grounds upon which warrants could issue”).
32
See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (paper bag); Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753 (1979) (suitcase); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (footlocker).
33
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981).
34
Id. at 462–63 (allowing warrantless search of zippered pocket of black leather jacket
found on the back seat of vehicle).
35
Ross, 456 U.S. at 822.
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On the other hand, if we look closely at the Court’s actual practice, we
find that the Court is not as egalitarian in its treatment of containers as it
proclaims to be. In deciding which containers deserve Fourth Amendment
protection against governmental intrusion, the Court does not treat all
containers alike.
Using the Court’s broad definition of what constitutes a container, we
can think of containers as lying along a spectrum of Fourth Amendment
protection. Along this spectrum, houses are at the top because police
usually need to obtain a warrant based on probable cause before they can
enter and search a home. 36 Cars are at the bottom because police officers
may search a car without a warrant as long as they have probable cause or
reasonable grounds to believe there is contraband or evidence of a crime in
the car. 37
The position of portable containers along this spectrum has fluctuated
over the years. 38 Under the Container Doctrine, police with probable cause
36
Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth
Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 913 (2010). Stern notes, “[t]he Supreme Court has
defended the home as a sacred site at the ‘core of the Fourth Amendment.’” Id. (quoting
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612 (1999)).
37
See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L.
REV. 227, 275 (1984) (“In its judging of categories rather than cases, the Supreme Court has
treated automobiles as a class apart from homes, boxes and other things that may conceal
incriminating evidence.”). In other contexts, however, cars are treated similarly to houses.
For example, in the self-defense context, many states have begun applying no duty to retreat
rules, traditionally reserved for the home, to cars. FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2009); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:20(A)(3) (2010).
38
The position of bodies on this continuum also fluctuates. In many respects, bodies are
treated with less respect than cars since warrantless searches of the body are routinely
permitted. For example, a full search of the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest is
allowed without a search warrant or showing of probable cause to believe the arrestee is
concealing evidence of a crime on his person. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235
(1973). Limited pat-down frisks of a person without a warrant are allowed if the officer has
lawfully stopped the individual and has a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and
dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Warrantless strip searches of international
travelers are permitted if government agents have a reasonable suspicion that the person is
smuggling drugs into the country. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531,
541 (1985). School officials may strip search a high school student without a warrant if they
have a reasonable suspicion that the search is necessary to avert danger to other students or
that the student is concealing evidence in her underwear. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). Warrantless strip searches of pretrial detainees after
contact visits are constitutional even if there is no individualized suspicion specific to the
person being searched. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558–60 (1979). Some lower courts
have even permitted warrantless and suspicionless strip searches of pre-arraignment arrestees
prior to their entering the general jail population. See, e.g., Bull v. City and County of San
Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 982 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that San Francisco County Jail’s
blanket strip search policy, which permitted corrections officers to perform a visual
inspection of the breasts, buttocks, and genitalia of all pre-arraignment arrestees prior to
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to believe evidence of a crime or contraband is within a portable container
may seize the container but may not open or search it without first obtaining
a warrant or court order. 39 In requiring police to obtain a warrant prior to
searching a portable container, the Container Doctrine expressed a clear
preference for warrants, putting portable containers on almost equal footing
with homes on the spectrum of Fourth Amendment protection.40 Over the
years, however, the Court has gradually eroded the Container Doctrine by
permitting police officers in numerous situations to search containers
without a warrant. When police are able to search a container without a
warrant, portable containers are treated more like cars than houses. When
police are allowed to search a container without either a warrant or probable
cause, containers are given even less protection than cars.
A. UNITED STATES V. CHADWICK

The Supreme Court first announced the Container Doctrine in the 1977
case of United States v. Chadwick. 41 In Chadwick, Amtrak railroad
officials in San Diego, California watched as Gregory Machado and Bridget
Leary loaded a brown footlocker onto an Amtrak train bound for Boston,
Massachusetts. 42 They thought the trunk seemed unusually heavy for its
size and noticed that it was leaking talcum powder, a substance used by
drug dealers to mask the smell of marijuana or hashish. 43 Amtrak officials
reported their concerns to federal agents in San Diego who relayed this
information along with a detailed description of the individuals and the
footlocker to their counterparts in Boston. 44 When the train arrived in
Boston several days later, federal narcotics agents were waiting with a

admission into the general jail population, was reasonable and not violative of the Fourth
Amendment). But see United States v. Barnes, 506 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2007) (requiring
reasonable suspicion that an arrestee is concealing contraband on his person for a strip search
of that arrestee). On the other hand, for an intrusion into the body, the Court has suggested
that something more than a warrant based on probable cause is necessary. See, e.g., Winston
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (holding that probable cause and warrant not sufficient to
justify surgical removal of a bullet from a suspect’s body); see also Sherry F. Colb, The
Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642,
1649–50 (1998) (discussing Winston).
39
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
763–64 (1979).
40
Alschuler, supra note 37, at 277 (1984) (“After Chadwick, the warrant requirement
apparently applied to the search of big boxes called houses and small boxes called suitcases,
but it ordinarily did not extend to the search of middle-sized boxes called automobiles.”).
41
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1.
42
Id. at 3.
43
Id.
44
Id.
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police dog trained to detect marijuana.45 The agents, who had not procured
an arrest or search warrant, spotted Machado and Leary and watched them
as they claimed their suitcases and the footlocker from a baggage cart. 46
When Machado and Leary placed the footlocker on the floor and sat down
on it, the agents released the dog near the footlocker. 47 The dog silently
confirmed that the footlocker contained illegal drugs.48
A little later, Joseph Chadwick joined Machado and Leary, and the
three engaged the assistance of an attendant to move the footlocker, which
was locked with a padlock and a regular trunk lock, to Chadwick’s car.49
Chadwick, Machado, and the attendant lifted the 200-pound footlocker into
the trunk of Chadwick’s car. 50 While the trunk of the car was still open and
before the car was started, the narcotics agents arrested and then searched
the three individuals. The agents found the keys to the locked footlocker on
Machado. 51 They then transported the three individuals and the footlocker
and their luggage to the Federal Building. 52 Approximately ninety minutes
after the arrests, the agents opened the footlocker and found marijuana
within. 53
Chadwick, Machado, and Leary were indicted for conspiracy and
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.54 They moved to suppress
the marijuana found in the footlocker.55 The District Court found that the
warrantless search of the footlocker violated the Fourth Amendment and
ordered the marijuana excluded. 56 The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit affirmed, 57 and the Government appealed.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
warrantless search of the locked footlocker violated the Fourth
Amendment 58 even though the government agents had probable cause to
believe the footlocker contained controlled substances, presumably from the

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
Id.
United States v. Chadwick, 393 F. Supp. 763, 773 (D. Mass. 1975).
United States v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d 773, 782 (1st Cir. 1976).
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 6.
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observations of the Amtrak officials in San Diego 59 and the dog sniff of the
footlocker. 60 The Court noted that by placing personal effects in a doublelocked footlocker, the defendants had manifested an expectation that the
contents of the footlocker would remain private.61 The Court suggested
there was no problem with the agents seizing the footlocker since they had
probable cause to believe there were illegal drugs within.62 However, once
the footlocker was exclusively within the government’s control, there was
no danger that whatever was in the footlocker would be removed by the
defendants. 63 Given the lack of any exigent circumstances supporting an
immediate search, the Court held that government agents should have
sought a warrant from a neutral magistrate before opening the footlocker.64
The Court noted that the warrantless search could not be justified as a
search incident to arrest because the search of the footlocker took place an
hour-and-a-half after the arrest, and thus was not substantially
contemporaneous with the arrest. 65
To understand the Container Doctrine, it is useful to examine the
Government’s arguments, which were considered but ultimately rejected by
the Court. The Government started by referencing the historical debate
over the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 66 Invoking a strain of the
Separate Clauses view of the Fourth Amendment, the Government
contended that the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause protected only
those interests traditionally identified with the home. 67 The Government
noted that the Framers adopted the Warrant Clause primarily in response to
unjustified intrusions into private homes on the authority of colonial writs
of assistance or general warrants. 68 The Government further argued there
was no evidence that the Framers intended “to modify the initial clause of

59
Id. at 3 (“Their suspicions were aroused when they noticed that the trunk was
unusually heavy for its size, and that it was leaking talcum powder, a substance often used to
mask the odor of marihuana or hashish.”).
60
Id. at 4.
61
Id. at 11.
62
Id. at 13 (“The initial seizure and detention of the footlocker, the validity of which
respondents do not contest, were sufficient to guard against any risk that evidence might be
lost.”).
63
Id. at 4, 13.
64
Id. at 15–16.
65
Id. at 15.
66
Id. at 6.
67
Id. David Steinberg supports this reading of the Fourth Amendment. Steinberg, supra
note 15, at 264–65 (arguing that the Framers intended to require warrants only for home
entries).
68
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 6.
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the Fourth Amendment by making warrantless searches supported by
probable cause per se unreasonable.” 69
Chief Justice Burger acknowledged that “silence in the historical
record tells us little about the Framers’ attitude toward the application of the
Warrant Clause to the search of respondent’s footlocker.” 70 Nonetheless,
the Chadwick Court ultimately rejected the Government’s argument,
explaining, “We do not agree that the Warrant Clause protects only
dwellings and other specifically designated locales.” 71 Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Burger explained:
[I]f there is little evidence that the Framers intended the Warrant Clause to operate
outside the home, there is no evidence at all that they intended to exclude from the
protection of the Clause all searches occurring outside the home. The absence of a
contemporary outcry against warrantless searches in public places was because, aside
from searches incident to arrest, such warrantless searches were not a large issue in
colonial America. 72

Expressing support for the Warrant Preference view, Chief Justice
Burger noted the “strong historical connection between the Warrant Clause
and the initial clause of the Fourth Amendment, which draws no distinction
among ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’ in safeguarding against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” 73 Further linking the two clauses,
Chief Justice Burger explained:

69

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8–9. While it is true that there is little in the historical record that tells us
whether the Framers believed a warrant was necessary for a container search, there is some
early common law support for the Container Doctrine. Almost one hundred years before the
Chadwick decision, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between letters and sealed
packages, on the one hand, and newspapers and pamphlets, on the other. Ex parte Jackson,
96 U.S. 727, 732 (1878). The Court in Ex parte Jackson held that postal inspectors could not
without a warrant open letters and sealed packages to determine whether they contained
articles that Congress had prohibited from being mailed, but could freely inspect
newspapers, magazines, and pamphlets. Id. at 733. Presumably, the Court recognized the
heightened expectations of privacy in sealed letters and packages and the warrant process as
a means of protecting those expectations of privacy. On the other hand, there is also some
indication that courts in the pre-Chadwick era gave less protection to containers in cars.
Yale Kamisar notes that until 1977, when Chadwick was decided, “it was widely assumed
that if the circumstances authorized a warrantless search of a vehicle under the Carroll
Doctrine [the automobile exception], they also permitted a warrantless search of luggage or
other containers found within the vehicle.” Yale Kamisar, The “Automobile Search” Cases:
The Court Does Little to Clarify the “Labyrinth” of Judicial Uncertainty, in THE SUPREME
COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1980–1981: AN EDITED TRANSCRIPT OF THE THIRD
ANNUAL SUPREME COURT REVIEW AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SYMPOSIUM 82 (Dorothy
Opperman ed., 1982).
71
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 7.
72
Id. at 8–9.
73
Id.
70
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Our fundamental inquiry in considering Fourth Amendment issues is whether or not a
search or seizure is reasonable under all the circumstances. The judicial warrant has a
significant role to play in that it provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate,
which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried
judgment of a law enforcement officer “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.” 74

The Chadwick Court concluded that by placing personal effects into a
double-locked footlocker, the defendants manifested an expectation that its
contents would remain free from public examination. 75 The Court noted,
“No less than one who locks the doors of his home against intruders, one
who safeguards his personal possessions in this manner is due the
protection of the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause.”76 In essence, the
Court put portable containers on an equal footing with private homes.
The Government also argued that luggage is analogous to motor
vehicles in that both are readily mobile. 77 Since the Court allows police to
engage in warrantless searches of automobiles whenever they have probable
cause to believe there is evidence of a crime within the vehicle, the
Government argued that the Court should similarly allow warrantless
searches of luggage as long as police have probable cause to believe
evidence of a crime is within the luggage. 78 The Chadwick Court rejected
this argument as well, noting that “[t]he factors which diminish the privacy
aspects of an automobile do not apply to respondent’s footlocker.”79 The
Court explained that one has a lessened expectation of privacy in a motor
vehicle because its primary function is transportation, not serving as the
repository for one’s personal effects. 80 Moreover, a motor vehicle is subject
to pervasive regulation and travels on public thoroughfares where both its
occupants and contents are in plain view. 81 In contrast, the contents of
luggage are not open to public view, and luggage is not subject to regular
inspections. 82

74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 12–13.
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B. ARKANSAS V. SANDERS

In Arkansas v. Sanders, the Court extended Chadwick to a case
involving an unlocked suitcase in the trunk of a taxicab. 83 In light of the
fact that the footlocker in Chadwick was seized just after it was placed in
the trunk of Chadwick’s car whereas the suitcase in Sanders was placed in
the trunk of the taxicab and then driven several blocks before it was seized,
the container in Sanders had a greater nexus to the vehicle than the
container in Chadwick. Sanders thus offered the Court the opportunity to
clarify whether the automobile exception permitted the warrantless search
of a container in a running motor vehicle. 84 It also gave the Court the
opportunity to draw a distinction between locked and unlocked containers,
if it so desired.
The police in Sanders received a tip from an informant who had given
reliable information to the police in the past. The informant told police that
Sanders would be flying into Little Rock, Arkansas on a particular
American Airlines flight, carrying a green suitcase that contained
marijuana. 85 Police set up surveillance at the airport, and watched as
Sanders retrieved a green suitcase from the baggage claim area.86 Sanders
gave the suitcase to another man who placed it into the trunk of a waiting
taxicab. 87 When the taxi drove away, the officers followed it for a few
blocks before stopping it.88 The taxi driver opened the trunk for the
officers. 89 Without asking Sanders for permission, the officers opened the
unlocked suitcase that was in the trunk and found 9.3 pounds of marijuana
within. 90
This time, the Government argued that the warrantless search of the
suitcase was valid under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement, which allows law enforcement officers to conduct warrantless
83

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565 (1991).
84
In Chadwick, government officials seized the padlocked footlocker just after the
defendant placed it in the trunk of his car. 433 U.S. at 4. In Sanders, the police followed the
taxicab which contained the suitcase at issue for several blocks before stopping the taxi and
searching the suitcase. 442 U.S. at 755. Writing for the Court in Arkansas v. Sanders,
Justice Powell explained, “We took this case by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of
Arkansas to resolve some apparent misunderstanding as to the application of our decision in
United States v. Chadwick . . . to warrantless searches of luggage seized from automobiles.”
Id. at 754.
85
Id. at 755.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
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searches of motor vehicles when they have probable cause to believe there
is evidence of a crime within the vehicle.91 According to the Government,
because the officers had probable cause to believe there was marijuana in
the suitcase that was in a motor vehicle, the officers had the right to search
the suitcase without a warrant. 92
Reflecting its support for the Warrant Preference view, the Sanders
Court rejected the Government’s argument. The Court reiterated that “[a]
lawful search of luggage generally may be performed only pursuant to a
warrant.” 93 Echoing Chadwick, the Sanders Court declined to extend the
automobile exception to searches of luggage in automobiles for two
reasons. First, because the officers had seized the luggage and had it
exclusively under their control, there was “not the slightest danger that [the
luggage] or its contents could have been removed before a valid search
warrant could be obtained.” 94 The fact that the luggage was found in a
taxicab, a motor vehicle, did not change the fact that the police had seized
the luggage and had it securely within their control.95 Second, the Court
emphasized the heightened expectations of privacy associated with luggage,
noting that “luggage is a common repository for one’s personal effects, and
therefore is inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy.” 96 The
Sanders Court noted that a suitcase taken from an automobile “is not
necessarily attended by any lesser expectation of privacy than is associated
with luggage taken from other locations.”97 The Court explained:
One is not less inclined to place private, personal possessions in a suitcase merely
because the suitcase is to be carried in an automobile rather than transported by other
means or temporarily checked or stored. Indeed, the very purpose of a suitcase is to
serve as a repository for personal items when one wishes to transport them. 98

Writing for the Sanders Court, Justice Powell suggested in a footnote
that “[n]ot all containers and packages found by police during the course of
a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment.” 99 He
explained, “[S]ome containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun
case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of
privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward
91
Id. at 761. For an extended discussion of the automobile exception, see infra text
accompanying notes 180–224.
92
Sanders, 442 U.S. at 761.
93
Id. at 762.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 763.
96
Id. at 762.
97
Id. at 764.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 764 n.13.
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appearance.” 100 Justice Powell further opined that a warrant would not be
necessary where the contents of a package are open to plain view. 101
Footnote 13 in Sanders led some lower courts to draw a distinction
between “worthy” and “unworthy” containers, or containers protected by
the Fourth Amendment and containers not so protected, 102 a distinction that
a plurality of the Court rejected in 1981. In Robbins v. California, in
opposing a motion to suppress fifteen pounds of marijuana found in
packages wrapped in green opaque plastic in a recessed luggage
compartment of a car, the State of California argued that “the Fourth
Amendment protects only containers commonly used to transport ‘personal
effects.’” 103 It urged the Court to draw “a distinction between pieces of
sturdy luggage, like suitcases, and flimsier containers, like cardboard
boxes.” 104 A plurality of the Court rejected the State’s attempt to draw a
distinction between worthy and unworthy containers, explaining that it
would be “difficult if not impossible” to come up with objective criteria to
draw such a distinction. 105 The Court noted, “What one person may put
into a suitcase, another may put into a paper bag.” 106 In response to the
State’s objection that footnote 13 in Arkansas v. Sanders supported a
distinction between worthy and unworthy containers, Justice Stewart
explained that footnote 13 simply meant that if a container’s contents were
apparent, then under the plain view doctrine, it would not be protected by
the Fourth Amendment. 107
Concurring in the Robbins opinion, Justice Powell disagreed with the
plurality’s interpretation of footnote 13 in Sanders, which he had
authored. 108 He suggested what Albert Alschuler has called a tripartite rule
for container searches. 109 Under Justice Powell’s proposed rule, police
100

Id. at 764–65 n.13.
Id.
102
Alschuler, supra note 37, at 278 (noting that Justice Powell’s statement in footnote 13
“led some lower courts to distinguish ‘worthy containers’ whose search ordinarily would
require advance judicial approval, from ‘unworthy containers,’ which police officers could
search without warrants and without probable cause”); Robert A. Wainger, The Warrant
Requirement for Container Searches and the “Well-Delineated” Exceptions: The New
“Bright Line” Rules, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 115, 120 (1981) (“After Sanders the federal
courts of appeals frequently distinguished containers that were analogous to luggage from
those that were not . . . . Containers of a less substantial nature than luggage consequently
were subject to warrantless searches.”).
103
453 U.S. 420, 425 (1981).
104
Id. at 425–26.
105
Id. at 426.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 427.
108
Id. at 429 (Powell, J., concurring).
109
Alschuler, supra note 37, at 278.
101
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would always need a warrant prior to searching a container “inevitably
associated with the expectation of privacy,” such as personal luggage. 110
Police would never need a warrant to search containers that “consistently
lack such an association,” such as plastic cups and brown paper grocery
bags. 111 For containers that may be used as repositories of personal effects
but often are not, such as cardboard boxes and laundry bags, courts would
decide on a case-by-case basis whether the defendant manifested a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the container.112
Relevant to such an inquiry should be the size, shape, material, and condition of the
exterior, the context within which it is discovered, and whether the possessor had
taken some significant precaution, such as locking, securely sealing or binding the
container, that indicates a desire to prevent the contents from being displayed upon
simply mischance. 113

The next year, a majority of the Court laid to rest the idea that a
distinction should be drawn between “worthy” and “unworthy” containers.
In United States v. Ross, the Court noted that even though such a distinction
“could evolve in a series of cases in which paper bags, locked trunks, lunch
buckets, and orange crates were placed on one side of the line or the other,
the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a
distinction.” 114
There are many reasons to support increased Fourth Amendment
protection for certain containers. Some containers are so obviously
repositories for highly personal effects that most people would agree they
should be accorded strong Fourth Amendment protection. For example,
there is near universal consensus that the home is a place where privacy
expectations are strongest. 115 This is in part because the “home is a place
where intimate things are kept from prying eyes and intimate relationships
are carried on away from prying ears.” 116 Many would regard wallets and
110
Robbins, 453 U.S. at 434 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979)).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982).
115
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment draws “a firm line at the entrance to the house”) (quoting Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)); Payton, 445 U.S. at 603 (requiring a warrant for an in-home
arrest); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that the State may not
prosecute an individual for possessing obscene materials in the privacy of his or her own
home). Some individuals’ homes, however, are provided less Fourth Amendment protection
than others. See infra text accompanying notes 391–430 (discussing lower court opinions
holding that a homeless person lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home on
public property).
116
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 997 (1982).
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purses with equal regard since they too are repositories for highly personal
effects, the contents of which we would not ordinarily share with total
strangers or even close friends. Margaret Radin makes a convincing case
for treating cars like homes insofar as meriting Fourth Amendment
protection against governmental intrusion without a warrant. 117 Through
the automobile exception, the Court has “in essence declared that cars are
generally not considered private.” 118 Radin notes, however, that “[c]ars are
the repository of personal effects, and cars form the backdrop for carrying
on private thoughts or intimate relationships, just as homes do.” 119 Most
people would not be happy if the government could, without any
justification or prior court approval, place a listening device in our cars and
listen in on all of our car conversations. 120
On the other hand, most of us would agree that the police should be
allowed to take steps to determine whether an apparently abandoned or
forgotten backpack, suitcase, or package left unattended on a public
sidewalk or in an area frequented by many people, such as a metro station
or airport, contains explosive material. Law enforcement authorities,
however, can often determine whether a package contains explosive
material without opening it. For example, they can use a bomb-sniffing dog
to determine whether a piece of luggage contains explosives. Even when it
established the Container Doctrine, the Court recognized that exigent
circumstances would permit the warrantless search of a container.121
On balance, I think the Court is correct in refusing to draw a
distinction between worthy and unworthy containers. A poor person who
cannot afford a home or a car may keep his most prized possessions in
plastic garbage bags that others might use for their trash. If the Court
protects the wealthy person’s home and the containers within it from
governmental intrusion absent probable cause and a warrant, it ought to
protect the poor person’s garbage bags.
With Chadwick and Sanders, the Court thus established the Container
Doctrine—the rule that if police have probable cause to believe contraband
or evidence of a crime is in a locked or unlocked container, they may seize

117

Id. at 1001.
Id. at 1000.
119
Id. at 1001.
120
Indeed, most of us would probably not like it if the government were to place a
tracking device on our cars and follow our every driving movement. The Court’s
jurisprudence allows the government to do just this as long as the car stays on the public
roads. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). Since the government does not place
tracking devices on most of our cars, the vast majority of us either do not realize that this is
something the government can do or care enough to complain about it.
121
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977).
118
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that container without a warrant or consent, but cannot open it unless and
until they have obtained a warrant issued by a neutral judicial officer who
agrees with their assessment of probable cause, even if that container
happens to be in a motor vehicle.122 Two justifications support the
Container Doctrine. First, containers are repositories for personal effects
and therefore enjoy heightened expectations of privacy. 123 Second, once an
officer has seized a container and has it under his exclusive possession and
control, there is little or no danger that the owner of the container will gain
access to or destroy any evidence within the container.

122

As discussed below in Part IV.B., the Court later overruled Sanders while leaving
Chadwick on the books. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991).
123
As recently as 2000, the Court reinforced the notion that containers enjoy heightened
expectations of privacy. In Bond v. United States, the Court held that an officer’s
exploratory squeezing of a bus passenger’s duffel bag violated the passenger’s reasonable
expectations of privacy and therefore constituted a “search” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 529 U.S. 334, 335 (2000). The Court started by noting, “[I]t is
undisputed here that petitioner possessed a privacy interest in his bag.” Id. at 337. It then
found Bond’s expectation of privacy reasonable, explaining that “travelers are particularly
concerned about their carry-on luggage; they generally use it to transport personal items that,
for whatever reason, they prefer to keep close at hand.” Id. at 337–38. The Court viewed
the officer’s action of squeezing Bond’s bag for the purpose of determining whether it was
concealing contraband as extremely invasive, analogizing the officer’s action to a Terry frisk
of the person: “Although Agent Cantu did not ‘frisk’ petitioner’s person, he did conduct a
probing tactile examination of petitioner’s carry-on luggage.” Id. at 337; see also Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968). Notably, the Court rejected the Government’s argument
that the officer’s action did not constitute a search because the officer was just doing what
any bus passenger could have done. As anyone who has flown recently knows, it is quite
common for airline passengers seeking overhead bin space to move other passengers’ bags.
In other contexts, the Court has held that police action does not constitute a search if the
police officer is merely doing something any member of the public can do. See, e.g., Florida
v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (“Any member of the public could legally have been
flying over Riley’s property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could have
observed Riley’s greenhouse.”); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (“It is
common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are
readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the
public.”); United States v. Knotts 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (holding that use of a beeper
to track a car’s movements on the public roads was not a search because any member of the
public could have observed the defendant’s travels over public roads). The Court concluded
that “the agent’s physical manipulation of petitioner’s bag violated the Fourth Amendment.”
Bond, 529 U.S. at 339; see also David Rudstein, “Touchy” “Feely”—Is There a
Constitutional Difference? The Constitutionality of “Prepping” a Passenger’s Luggage for a
Human or Canine Sniff After Bond v. United States, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 214 (2001)
(arguing that “Bond should be interpreted broadly to encompass the physical manipulation
by a law enforcement officer of soft-sided luggage checked with the carrier by a passenger”).

2010]

THE DISAPPEARING CONTAINER DOCTRINE

1427

IV. THE DISAPPEARING CONTAINER DOCTRINE
Over the past several decades, the Court has substantially undermined
the Container Doctrine, permitting police to search containers without a
search warrant, and sometimes even without probable cause. Without
formally overruling Chadwick’s rule that a container search ordinarily
requires a warrant, the Court has authorized many warrantless container
searches under various exceptions to the warrant requirement.
In this Part, I discuss the numerous ways in which the police may
engage in warrantless searches of containers notwithstanding the Container
Doctrine. I show how the steady erosion of the Container Doctrine loosely
corresponds with the Court’s movement away from the Warrant Preference
view of the Fourth Amendment and its gradual embrace of the Separate
Clauses view. Just as the Court has waffled in its broader Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence between a preference for warrants and the view
that the Fourth Amendment requires only reasonableness, it has gone back
and forth between these two views when deciding whether and when police
may conduct warrantless searches of containers. Although not explicit in
any of its opinions, the Court’s ambivalence may reflect its skepticism
regarding the effectiveness of warrants and a deeper recognition that
warrants may not be as protective of privacy in practice as they are in
theory. 124
Starting with the search incident to arrest exception, this Part examines
the various exceptions to the warrant requirement that enable police officers
to search containers without a warrant. The requirements needed to satisfy
each exception are different, which is why it is best to think of these
exceptions as distinct ways that police can search our containers without a
warrant. It is important to recognize that the exceptions often overlap,
causing conceptual confusion. 125 More than one exception may justify the
same search. This is particularly true in car search cases, which can be
validated under the search incident to arrest exception, the automobile
exception, the consent doctrine, and the inventory search exception.
A. SEARCHES OF CONTAINERS INCIDENT TO ARREST

One way police officers can search a container without a warrant is
through the search incident to arrest exception. The Court has long
recognized that incident to a lawful custodial arrest, law enforcement agents
124

See Part II.A. for a discussion of problems with the warrant process.
Kamisar, supra note 70, at 73 (“[A]lthough conceptually distinct, in a typical case the
Carroll Doctrine and the “search incident” exception to the Warrant Clause do overlap ‘the
same probable cause that points to the likely presence of evidence in the vehicle points also
to the likely guilt of the driver.’”).
125
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may search the person of the arrestee and his wingspan, the area from which
the arrestee might grab a weapon or destroy evidence. 126 The two main
justifications for allowing officers to perform warrantless searches incident
to arrest are: (1) officer safety, and (2) preservation of evidence. 127
Warrantless searches incident to arrest occur more often than searches with
a warrant. 128
There are only two requirements for a valid search incident to arrest.
First, there must be a lawful, custodial arrest, and second, the search must
be substantially contemporaneous with the arrest. 129 No further justification
beyond the probable cause needed to arrest is necessary. 130 The officer
126

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755–68 (1969) (discussing prior search incident
to arrest cases). For an overview of the origins and evolution of the search incident to arrest
exception, see Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search
Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 385–90 (2001); see also Craig M. Bradley,
The Court’s “Two Model” Approach to the Fourth Amendment: Carpe Diem!, 84 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1993) (critiquing Robinson, Belton, and Acevedo); Adam M.
Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27 (2008) (arguing
that given the vast amount of information contained within iPhones, iPhones should be given
greater protection than ordinary containers under the search incident to arrest doctrine);
Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel
and Belton, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 657 (critiquing Chimel and Belton).
127
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
128
3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 5.2(b) (4th ed. 2004) (“While the myth persists that warrantless searches are
the exception, the fact is that searches incident to arrest occur with the greatest frequency.”);
Craig M. Bradley, The “Good Faith Exception” Cases: Reasonable Exercise in Futility, 60
IND. L.J. 287, 290 (1985) (noting that it is “well-known that far more evidence is obtained”
through warrantless searches, including searches incident to arrest, than with warrants);
Robert C. Fellmeth, The Optimum Remedy for Constitutional Breaches: Multiaccessed Civil
Penalties in Equity, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 923, 946 (1999) (“Search warrants are only involved in
a small percentage of criminal arrests. Most searches subject to suppression dispute are
those incident to arrest.”); Logan, supra note 126, at 382 (“[B]y far the commonest method
of searching is incident to an arrest.”).
129
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“It is the fact of the lawful
arrest that establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful
custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that
Amendment.”); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33–34 (1970) (“A search may be incident to
arrest ‘only if it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the
immediate vicinity of the arrest.’”) (quoting Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 819
(1968)).
130
The Court has substantially loosened the triggering requirements for a valid search
incident to arrest. For example, in Virginia v. Moore, the Court upheld a warrantless search
under the search incident to arrest exception even though the arrest was not lawful under
existing state law, suggesting that as long as the arrest is “constitutionally permissible,” it is
valid for search incident to arrest purposes. 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2007) (“We have
recognized, however, that officers may perform searches incident to constitutionally
permissible arrests in order to ensure their safety and safeguard evidence.”). The Court has
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need not have probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime on the
person of the arrestee or within the arrestee’s wingspan in order to search
the arrestee or his wingspan. 131
The rule that incident to a lawful custodial arrest, an officer may
conduct a full search of the person was established in United States v.
Robinson. 132 In Robinson, the Court held that incident to arrest, a police
officer may conduct a full search of the arrestee, including any containers
found on his person, even if the officer does not actually fear for his
personal safety or believe that the arrestee will destroy evidence.133
Robinson was stopped by an officer who, as a result of an investigation into
Robinson’s operator’s permit a few days earlier, had probable cause to
believe Robinson was operating a motor vehicle after revocation of his
permit. 134 After pulling over Robinson, the officer placed him under arrest
and proceeded to search Robinson face-to-face. 135 While patting him down,
the officer felt an object in the left breast pocket of Robinson’s heavy
coat. 136 The officer reached into Robinson’s pocket, pulled out a crumpled
up cigarette package, and opened it, finding fourteen gelatin capsules of
white powder which he suspected was (and which turned out to be)
heroin. 137 The Court upheld the officer’s actions, holding that incident to a
lawful custodial arrest, a police officer may conduct a full search of the
arrestee’s person. 138 The Robinson Court made clear that even though the
search incident to arrest exception is grounded in officer safety and
preservation of evidence rationales, the Government need not prove that the
officer actually feared for his safety or believed the arrestee was about to
destroy evidence in his possession. 139
In his dissent, Justice Marshall noted that in focusing on the right of
the officer to search the person of the arrestee incident to arrest, the
also upheld warrantless searches as searches incident to arrest even when the search was not
substantially contemporaneous with the arrest. See, e.g., id. at 167 n.1 (noting arresting
officers did not perform search incident to arrest immediately upon taking Moore into
custody because each officer mistakenly believed the other had already done so); United
States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (upholding search of suspect’s clothing ten hours
after arrest as a search incident to arrest).
131
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 3.5 (b) (5th ed. 2009) (“It is the fact
of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search . . . .”).
132
414 U.S. at 236.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 220–21.
135
Id. at 221–22.
136
Id. at 223.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 235.
139
Id. at 236.
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majority ignored the fact that the search in question also involved the search
of a container. 140 Rooting his dissent in one of the original rationales
behind the Container Doctrine, Justice Marshall pointed out that it would
not have been impracticable or dangerous for the officer to have obtained a
warrant prior to searching the cigarette package. 141 Once the officer had the
crumpled up cigarette package in his hands, it would have been virtually
impossible for Robinson to gain access to anything within the package. 142
Highlighting the possibility of unconscious class bias underlying the
decision, Justice Marshall opined that the case may have been resolved
differently had the defendant been a businessman or a lawyer and the
container a wallet or a sealed envelope:
One wonders if the result in this case would have been the same were respondent a
businessman who was lawfully taken into custody for driving without a license and
whose wallet was taken from him by the police. Would it be reasonable for the police
officer, because of the possibility that a razor blade was hidden somewhere within the
wallet, to open it, remove all the contents, and examine each item carefully? Or
suppose a lawyer lawfully arrested for a traffic offense is found to have a sealed
envelope on his person. Would it be permissible for the arresting officer to tear open
the envelope in order to make sure that it did not contain a clandestine weapon—
perhaps a pin or a razor blade? Would it not be more consonant with the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment and the legitimate needs of the police to require the officer, if
he has any question whatsoever about what the wallet or letter contains, to hold on to
it until the arrestee is brought to the precinct station? 143

Robinson was decided in 1973, four years before Chadwick and six
years before Sanders. In the 1970s, most of the Court’s opinions reflected
the Warrant Preference view of the Fourth Amendment. 144 Even Justice
Rehnquist, a later proponent of the Separate Clauses view, 145 acknowledged
140
Id. at 255 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The majority opinion fails to recognize that the
search conducted by Officer Jenks did not merely involve a search of respondent’s person. It
also included a separate search of the effects found on his person.”); see also Bradley, supra
note 126, at 434 (noting the possibility that the Robinson Court “simply did not consider the
cigarette package a sufficiently important repository of personal effects” to require a
warrant).
141
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 256 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142
Id. During oral argument, the Government had suggested that it would be
administratively inconvenient to require a police officer, after removing a container from an
arrestee’s person, to hold onto the container rather than look inside and determine what it
contained. Id. at 259 n.7. Justice Marshall responded to this argument by admonishing that
“[m]ere administrative inconvenience . . . cannot justify invasion of Fourth Amendment
rights.” Id.
143
Id. at 257–58 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
144
See Maclin, supra note 16, at 204 (noting that “[t]he warrant preference view grew in
stature during the latter half of the 1960’s and the early 1970’s”).
145
See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness.”); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981)
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the existence of a warrant requirement when writing the majority opinion in
Robinson. Justice Rehnquist started his analysis by noting, “It is well
settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” 146 However, hints
that Justice Rehnquist would later see the Fourth Amendment as requiring
nothing more than reasonableness are also evident in the opinion. In
announcing the holding, Justice Rehnquist wrote, “[W]e hold that in the
case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also
a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.” 147
In 1981, the Court extended the scope of a search incident to arrest to
include the passenger compartment of the car and any containers within
when the arrestee is an occupant or recent occupant of the vehicle.148 New
York v. Belton involved the search of a leather jacket found in the backseat
of a car stopped for speeding. 149 When the officer walked up to the car, he
smelled marijuana and saw an envelope marked “Supergold” on the floor of
the car, which prompted him to arrest the four men in the car.150 After
searching each of the four men, the officer searched the passenger
compartment of the car where he found a black leather jacket belonging to

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“It is often forgotten that nothing in the Fourth Amendment
requires that searches be conducted pursuant to warrants.”); see also Thomas Y. Davies,
Denying a Right By Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriguez Demeans Consent,
Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates the Excusability of Police
Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) (noting that instead of understanding Fourth
Amendment reasonableness as substantively satisfied by probable cause and warrants, “[t]he
Rehnquist Court . . . tends to read the reasonableness requirement in such a loose and
formless way that enforcement of the right announced in the Fourth Amendment is greatly
diminished”); Maclin, supra note 16, at 205 (“After he was appointed to the Court, then
Justice Rehnquist followed Justice White’s lead by arguing that the Fourth Amendment only
required that police intrusions be reasonable.”).
146
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224 (emphasis added).
147
Id. at 235.
148
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). Belton was substantially undermined
in 2009 when the Court decided Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009) (holding that
incident to the lawful arrest of the occupant of a car, an officer may search the passenger
compartment of the car if: (1) the passenger compartment is within the arrestee’s reaching
distance at the time of the search, or (2) the officer has reason to believe there is evidence
regarding the crime of arrest in the car). Justice Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion in
Gant, claimed the Court was not overruling Belton, but it is clear that the government can no
longer argue that anytime an occupant of a vehicle is lawfully arrested, the officer can search
the passenger compartment of the car regardless of whether it is within the arrestee’s
wingspan.
149
453 U.S. at 455–56.
150
Id.
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Belton. 151 The officer unzipped one of the pockets and found cocaine
within. 152
In analyzing whether the search of Belton’s leather jacket violated the
Fourth Amendment, the Court started by endorsing the Warrant Preference
view of the Fourth Amendment:
It is a first principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the police may not
conduct a search unless they first convince a neutral magistrate that there is probable
cause to do so. This Court has recognized, however, that “the exigencies of the
situation” may sometimes make exemption from the warrant requirement
“imperative.” 153

The Court then opined that the search of Belton’s jacket fell within the
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, reasoning
that when the occupant of a vehicle is arrested, the passenger compartment
is generally within the arrestee’s grabbing distance or wingspan. 154
Unlike the Robinson Court, which ignored the fact that the case
involved a container search, the Belton Court explicitly acknowledged that
it was dealing with a warrantless search of a container: “It follows from
this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of any
containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger
compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be
within his reach.” 155 The Court even provided a definition for the term
“container”: “‘Container’ here denotes any object capable of holding
another object. It thus includes closed or open glove compartments,
consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger
compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like.”156
151

Id. at 456.
Id. at 456.
153
Id. at 457 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 333 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).
154
Id. at 460 (“Our reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside
the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact
generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee might reach in order
to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].’” (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969))).
155
Id.
156
Id. at 460 n.4. While the Belton Court was careful to define what it meant by the
word “container,” it did not explicitly address whether an officer could search a locked
container found within the passenger compartment incident to an arrest. Arnold H. Loewy,
Cops, Cars, and Citizens: Fixing the Broken Balance, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 535, 551 (2002)
(noting that the question of whether a lawful warrantless search of the passenger
compartment incident to arrest includes locked containers remains open). Most lower courts
confronted with this question have held that an officer may search a locked container in the
passenger compartment of a car incident to the arrest of an occupant of the car, interpreting
the language in Belton that referred to closed or open receptacles within the passenger
compartment as broadly allowing a search of any container, locked or unlocked, found in the
152
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Despite the officer safety and preservation of evidence rationales
behind the search incident to arrest exception, the Belton Court, like the
Robinson Court, seemed unconcerned with whether there was actually any
danger that Belton or his companions could have gained access to a weapon
or evidence in the zippered pocket of Belton’s leather jacket. 157 The Court
explained that the need for clear, bright-line rules to guide police officers in
the field justified dispensing with a case-by-case consideration of whether
these justifications were actually present in cases involving searches of the
passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to arrest.158
In 2009, the Court reversed course, holding in Arizona v. Gant that
police officers may not search the passenger compartment of a motor
vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest unless the arrestee is actually
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the
search or there is reason to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the
offense of arrest. 159 Requiring the arrestee to be within reaching distance of
the passenger compartment at the time of the search reflects a return to the
original justifications behind the search incident to arrest doctrine—
justifications grounded in officer safety and evidence preservation concerns.
Allowing the officer to search the passenger compartment if he has reason
to believe it contains evidence related to the crime of arrest was a
concession to Justice Scalia who had proposed such a rule in his
concurrence in Thornton v. United States, an earlier case which held that the
car’s interior. See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 512 F.3d 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Howe, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184–85 (D. Utah 2003) (“The Court finds the search
of the locked briefcase analogous to the search of a locked glove compartment, which
several circuits have found permissible.”); State v. Fry, 388 N.W.2d 565, 576 (Wis. 1986)
(“We conclude that all closed containers, locked or unlocked, in an automobile which may
be searched incident to an arrest can be searched.”). A few courts, in contrast, have held that
an officer may not search a locked container found in the passenger compartment of a car
incident to arrest, noting that the contents of a locked container generally are not readily
accessible to the arrestee and that by locking the container, the arrestee has manifested a
heightened expectation of privacy. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 45 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Wash.
2002) (“[L]ocked containers within a vehicle may not be searched incident to an occupant’s
arrest.”); State v. Stroud, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (Wash. 1986) (holding that the Washington state
constitution requires an officer conducting a search incident to arrest to obtain a warrant
before unlocking and searching a locked container found in the passenger compartment of a
car).
157
453 U.S. at 458.
158
Id. For a critique of the Court’s embrace of bright-line rules, see Alschuler, supra
note 37; Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition:
Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 MISS. L.J. 341, 393–95
(2004) (arguing that the desire for determinacy has led the Court to embrace bright-line rules
that have the unintended consequence of undermining the legitimacy of police search
power).
159
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
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rule of Belton applies even when the officer initiates contact with the
arrestee after the arrestee has exited the vehicle.160
Focusing on reasonableness, the State argued that searches incident to
arrest of the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle are reasonable even
in cases where the arrestee is not actually able to access the passenger
compartment because law enforcement interests, particularly the interest in
bright-line rules, outweigh the arrestee’s limited privacy interest in his
vehicle. 161 The Court rejected this argument, accusing the State of
“seriously undervalu[ing] the privacy interests at stake.” 162 The Court
160

Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004). In Thornton, Justice Scalia proposed
a rule that would enable an officer to engage in a search incident to arrest of the vehicle
whenever he has reason to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in
the car. Id. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring). The majority opinion in Arizona v. Gant thus
reflects a marriage of convenience. Three of the Justices (Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg)
probably would have been happy with a rule limiting Belton searches to cases where the
arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search,
but in order to get Justices Scalia and Thomas on board, they adopted Justice Scalia’s
proposal allowing an officer to search the passenger compartment incident to arrest when the
officer has reason to believe there is evidence relating to the crime of arrest in the vehicle.
By incorporating Justice Scalia’s proposal, the Court may have unwittingly opened the
door to future erosion of motorists’ privacy interests. While prong one of the new Gant test
(allowing warrantless searches of the passenger compartment if the arrestee is actually
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search) arguably
makes it more difficult for officers to search vehicles incident to arrest, prong two (allowing
a warrantless search of the passenger compartment if the officer has reason to believe the
vehicle contains evidence of the crime of arrest) arguably makes it easier because it allows
an officer to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle practically any time the
occupant is arrested for a crime other than a traffic violation. James J. Tomkovicz, Divining
and Designing the Future of the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine: Avoiding Instability,
Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1470 (arguing that “[a]n endorsement
of [Justice Scalia’s] evidence-gathering theory for searches incident to arrest would likely
expand officers’ authority to conduct searches incident to arrest whenever an offense is of a
sort that ‘might’ entail evidence or contraband”). Moreover, if an officer has reason to
believe there is evidence of the crime of arrest somewhere in the vehicle, there is no
principled reason to restrict the search to the passenger compartment. The reason Belton
restricted the search incident to arrest to the passenger compartment was because the Court
felt the passenger compartment was generally within the recent occupant’s grabbing
distance. A closed trunk, in contrast, is not. If the reason for allowing the search is because
the officer has reason to believe evidence of a crime is in the vehicle, it does not make sense
to restrict the search to the passenger compartment. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1731 (Alito, J.,
dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Alito noted that it was unclear why the court used the
standard “reason to believe” rather than probable cause, suggesting that “reason to believe”
is a lower standard than probable cause. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). This interpretation makes
sense because if an officer has probable cause to believe evidence of a crime is in the
vehicle, then he can engage in a warrantless search of the vehicle under the automobile
exception.
161
Id. at 1720.
162
Id.
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explained that even though “a motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle is
less substantial than in his home, the former interest is nevertheless
deserving of constitutional protection.” 163
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens, then the oldest member of the
Court, grounded the majority opinion in the Warrant Preference view of the
Fourth Amendment. Justice Stevens noted:
Consistent with our precedent, our analysis begins, as it should in every case
addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, with the basic rule that
“searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” 164

Acknowledging that Belton had “been widely understood [as allowing] a
vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there [was]
no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the
search,” 165 Justice Stevens noted that this broad reading of Belton had the
undesired effect of untethering the Belton rule from the original
justifications underlying the search incident to arrest exception. 166
Moreover, Justice Stevens noted that Belton was based on the faulty
assumption that articles within the passenger compartment are generally
within the arrestee’s grabbing distance when the arrestee is an occupant or
recent occupant of the vehicle. He concluded, “We now know that articles
inside the passenger compartment are rarely ‘within the area within which
an arrestee might reach.’” 167
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Alito accused the majority of
overruling Belton without saying so. 168 Somewhat disingenuously, Justice
Stevens denied that the Court was overruling Belton, 169 claiming it was
simply rejecting a popular but erroneous reading of Belton. 170 To justify the
different results in the two cases, Justice Stevens distinguished the facts in
Gant from the facts in Belton. He pointed out that in Belton, a single officer
was dealing with four unsecured arrestees.171 In Gant, in contrast, there
were five officers and only three arrestees, all of whom had been
handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars before the officers searched

163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

Id.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
Id. at 1718.
Id. at 1719.
Id. at 1723 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)).
Id. at 1726 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1722 n.9.
Id. at 1722–23.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 455–56.
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Gant’s car. 172 In Belton, given the number of arrestees and the fact that they
were not handcuffed or secured in the back of a locked patrol car, it was
possible that one or more of the four arrestees could have rushed the car,
overpowered the one officer, and gained access to weapons or evidence in
the car. In Gant, it was highly unlikely that the handcuffed arrestees who
were locked in the back of separate patrol cars could have harmed any of
the officers or accessed evidence in the car. Another key difference
between the two cases involved the offense of arrest. The arrestees in
Belton were arrested for drug offenses and the arresting officer had reason
to believe there were drugs in the car because he smelled marijuana and saw
an envelope with the label “Supergold” when he walked up to the car.173 In
Gant, the defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license and
there was no reason to believe evidence of this crime would be found in his
car. 174
While Gant changes what is required to justify the search of a vehicle
incident to arrest of an occupant or recent occupant of the vehicle,175 it does
not change the scope of what may be searched. Belton is still good law
insofar as it defines the permissible scope of a search of a vehicle incident
to arrest. Incident to a lawful custodial arrest of a recent occupant of the
vehicle, an officer can still only search the passenger compartment of the
vehicle, not the trunk. 176 Moreover, Gant did not modify the Belton
definition of a container.
The search incident to arrest exception thus allows an officer who has
executed a valid custodial arrest to conduct a warrantless search of (1)
containers found on the person of the arrestee,177 (2) containers within the
arrestee’s wingspan, 178 and (3) if the arrestee is an occupant or recent
occupant of the car, containers in the passenger compartment of the car if
the passenger compartment is within the arrestee’s reaching distance at the
time of the search or the officer has reason to believe there is evidence

172

Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 455–56.
174
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
175
Under the prior interpretation of Belton, all that was needed to search the passenger
compartment of a car was a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant or recent occupant of a
vehicle. Under the current reading of Belton, in addition to a lawful custodial arrest, the
arrestee must be within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the
search or the officer must have reason to believe evidence of the crime of arrest is in the
vehicle. See Gant, 123 S. Ct. at 1723.
176
Id. at 1720 (“Belton searches authorize police officers to search not just the passenger
compartment but every purse, briefcase, or other container within that space.”).
177
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
178
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
173
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regarding the crime of arrest in the car.179 The officer need not demonstrate
that he had probable cause to believe the container being searched
contained contraband or evidence of a crime.
B. SEARCHES OF CONTAINERS UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION

The most significant incursions on the Container Doctrine have
occurred in the context of container searches in automobiles. Not only can
police officers search containers in the passenger compartment of a car
incident to a lawful custodial arrest under the circumstances described
above, but under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement,
police may also search any part of a motor vehicle, including containers
within, as long as they have probable cause to believe contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found within the vehicle. 180 Probable cause is
the only requirement for a valid automobile exception search.181 It is not
necessary for the government to show exigent circumstances or that it
would have been impracticable to obtain a warrant in advance. 182
Warrantless searches of automobiles under the automobile exception
are allowed for two reasons. First, the ready mobility of a motor vehicle
makes it impracticable for law enforcement officers to secure a search
warrant. 183 Second, individuals supposedly have diminished expectations
of privacy in motor vehicles because motor vehicles are subject to pervasive
governmental regulation.184
Before 1991, whether police needed a warrant to search a container
found in a car depended on whether the officer had probable cause to
179

Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). For an excellent critique of the
automobile exception, see Lewis R. Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed: The Rise
of a Public Place Exemption to the Warrant Requirement, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375
(1986) (arguing that the automobile exception has become a public place exception,
eliminating the warrant requirement for effects found in public places).
181
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (holding that probable cause alone
satisfies the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment).
182
Id. at 466–67 (“[U]nder our established precedent, the ‘automobile exception’ has no
separate exigency requirement.”).
183
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1985).
184
Id. at 391. Those who drive frequently may disagree with the Court’s assumption that
individuals have diminished expectations of privacy in their cars. At least eighty-four
million Americans drive to work alone in their cars each day. See David A. Harris, Car
Wars: The Fourth Amendment’s Death on the Highway, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 576
(1998) (noting that “[d]espite the congestion, expense, and environmental damage caused by
cars, most Americans go to work in private vehicles” and “more than eighty-four million
drive to work alone” while “another fifteen million travel in car pools”). These drivers do
not expect government officials to inspect the contents of their vehicles, even though they
may be subject to annual inspections for safety and emissions purposes.
180
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believe there was evidence of a crime somewhere within the vehicle or in a
container in the vehicle. 185 In United States v. Ross, the Court held that if a
police officer had probable cause to believe there was contraband or
evidence of a crime somewhere in a vehicle, he could search every part of
the vehicle, including containers that could hold the object of the search. 186
In contrast, if the officer had probable cause to believe evidence of a crime
would be found in a container and nowhere else in the car, then the officer
had to get a warrant in order to search that container. 187 In other words, if
the officer had probable cause as to the car in general, i.e., a reasonable
belief that there was contraband or evidence of a crime somewhere within
the car, the automobile exception applied, and the officer did not need a
warrant to search the car. If, on the other hand, the officer had probable
cause specific to a container in the car, i.e., a reasonable belief that
contraband or evidence of a crime was inside a container that happened to
be in the car, then the Container Doctrine applied, and the officer had to
obtain a warrant to search the container.
Adhering to the Warrant Preference view, the Ross Court noted that
“[t]he Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and
seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that ‘searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” 188 The Ross
Court reaffirmed Sanders and the Container Doctrine as it applied to
containers in cars.
In California v. Acevedo, the Court abandoned the careful distinction
drawn in Ross between permissible and impermissible searches of
containers in cars. 189 While proclaiming fidelity to the Warrant Preference

185

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
Id. at 825. The Ross Court was careful to note that it was not overruling Arkansas v.
Sanders. Id. at 824.
187
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572 (1991) (explaining that under Ross, the
Carroll doctrine covered searches of automobiles where the police had probable cause to
search an entire vehicle, but Chadwick governed if the officer had probable cause to search
only a container within a vehicle); see also Bradley, supra note 126, at 438 (noting that until
Acevedo, “if police had probable cause only to search a suitcase or other container found in
an automobile, they had to obtain a search warrant before opening the container,” but “if
they had probable cause to search the automobile generally, then they could search it fully,
including opening any containers found therein”); Katz, supra note 21, at 417 (noting that by
not overruling Sanders, the Ross Court left intact the rule that police “may not rely upon the
broad warrant exemption for automobiles to search containers found in a vehicle when the
probable cause focused upon the container prior to being place in the automobile”).
188
Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 327 (1967)).
189
500 U.S. at 565.
186

2010]

THE DISAPPEARING CONTAINER DOCTRINE

1439

view, 190 the Acevedo Court essentially eliminated the warrant requirement
for containers in cars, holding that a warrant is not necessary to search a
container in a car as long as police officers have probable cause to believe
evidence of a crime will be found in that container.191 The Court justified
this holding by finding that such searches fell within the automobile
exception, an exception that was “specifically established and well
delineated.” 192
The Court provided three rationales for its new rule. First, the Court
opined that the Ross rule encouraged broader searches than the rule it
announced. 193 Under Ross, police officers wishing to search a container in
a car without getting a warrant needed probable cause to search the entire
car. 194 To establish such broad probable cause, the Acevedo Court opined,
police would be tempted to search the entire car rather than just the
container. 195
The problem with this argument is that police cannot manufacture
probable cause to search a car by searching the entire car. Whether or not
an officer has probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found
somewhere in the car must be determined on the basis of the facts known to
the officer prior to the search. If the facts and circumstances known to the
officer before the search would have led him to believe evidence of a crime
could only be found in a container in a car, then a search of the entire car
will not change those facts and circumstances. Under Ross, the officer
under such circumstances would only be allowed to search the container,
not the entire car.
Second, the Acevedo Court expressed doubt as to whether the
Container Doctrine substantially protects privacy interests. 196 If the police
have probable cause to seize a container, the Court reasoned, a search

190
Id. at 580 (noting that it “remains a cardinal principle that searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions”) (internal quotations omitted).
191
Id. at 579.
192
Id. at 580.
193
Id. at 574 (“The line between probable cause to search a vehicle and probable cause to
search a package in that vehicle is not always clear, and separate rules that govern the two
objects to be searched may enable the police to broaden their power to make warrantless
searches . . . .”).
194
United State v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
195
500 U.S. at 574–75 (“If the police know that they may open a bag only if they are
actually searching the entire car, they may search more extensively than they otherwise
would in order to establish the general probable cause required by Ross.”).
196
Id. at 575 (“To the extent that the Chadwick-Sanders rule protects privacy, its
protection is minimal.”).
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warrant will generally be forthcoming. 197 In other words, a judicial
magistrate will likely agree with the officer’s assessment of probable cause
and issue a warrant.
The problem with this argument is that it completely disregards the
reason why warrants are usually required in the first instance. We want the
probable cause determination to be made by a neutral and detached judicial
officer, not someone who is in the business of enforcing the law. While the
police officer’s conclusion that there is probable cause to search may often
be correct, it is also possible that a judicial officer will disagree with the
officer’s assessment of the situation. To say that we should dispense with
the warrant requirement because the officer has already decided there is
probable cause, and a warrant is therefore likely to be forthcoming, is to
miss this critical point.
Third, the Acevedo Court stressed the need for a bright-line rule to
guide law enforcement officers in the field.198 The Court felt the
discrepancy between the Carroll doctrine (the automobile exception) and
the Chadwick-Sanders rule (the Container Doctrine) had confused law
enforcement, and the rule it was announcing would be easier for police
officers in the field to apply. 199 The problem with this rationale is that the
administrative convenience that bright-line rules provide to police should
not trump the constitutional rights of individual citizens. 200 In the words of
Justice Brennan, “[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more
efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.” 201
In a harsh critique of the Container Doctrine, the Acevedo Court noted,
“The Chadwick-Sanders rule not only has failed to protect privacy but also
has confused courts and police officers and impeded effective law
The Court then explicitly overruled Sanders and
enforcement.” 202
established the rule that governs containers in cars today: if police have
probable cause to believe that evidence of crime is inside a container that
197

Id. (“Since the police, by hypothesis, have probable cause to seize the property, we
can assume that a warrant will be routinely forthcoming in the overwhelming majority of
cases.”) (internal quotation omitted).
198
Id. at 579 (“We conclude that it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern
automobile searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed containers set forth in
Sanders.”).
199
Id. at 577 (“The discrepancy between the two rules has led to confusion for law
enforcement officers.”).
200
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 258 n.7 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“[A]dministrative inconvenience . . . cannot justify invasion of Fourth Amendment
rights . . . .”).
201
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 469 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)).
202
500 U.S. at 576.
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happens to be in a car, they can search that container without a warrant. 203
If police have probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is
somewhere inside a vehicle, they can search anywhere within the vehicle,
including any and all containers in the vehicle, that might hold the object of
the search. 204 If probable cause is limited to the container, police can search
the container but cannot search anywhere else in the vehicle.205
While critical of the Container Doctrine, the Acevedo Court did not
eliminate it completely. Police still need a warrant to search a container
found on the street, as opposed to one found in a motor vehicle. 206 Justice
Scalia noted that this created an anomaly. 207 If police have probable cause
to believe there is evidence of a crime in a container carried by a person on
the street and do not have probable cause to arrest that person, they cannot
search the container unless they get a warrant. 208 If the person puts that
container in a car, then all of a sudden police can search the very same
container without a warrant. 209 Indeed, in Acevedo, the police waited until
Acevedo placed the paper bag that they believed contained drugs into the
trunk of his car before attempting to search it,210 presumably because the
police knew they would need a warrant if they seized the bag on the
street. 211
In Wyoming v. Houghton, the Court further reduced protections for
containers in cars when it held that probable cause to believe that the driver
of a vehicle has illegal drugs in the car gives the police the authority to
conduct a warrantless search of a passenger’s purse found on the backseat
floor of the passenger compartment, even if the police have no
particularized reason to believe drugs are in the passenger’s purse.212
Writing for the Houghton Court in 1999, Justice Scalia did not even pay lip

203

Id. at 580.
Id. (“The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they
have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.”).
205
Id.
206
See Bradley, supra note 126, at 439 (“If such a suitcase or briefcase is not found in a
vehicle, Acevedo suggests that Chadwick will still apply.”).
207
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 584 (Scalia, J., concurring).
208
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
209
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
210
Id. at 567.
211
This inconsistency between the no warrant required rule for containers in automobiles
and the warrant requirement rule for containers on the street created by the Acevedo decision
prompted one scholar, James Tomkovicz, to predict the imminent demise of the Container
Doctrine. Tomkovicz, supra note 20, at 1115 (“At the very least, the Court is poised to
abandon Chadwick and to exempt all searches outside of private buildings from the rule that
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.”).
212
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
204
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service to the Warrant Preference view, quoting only the first part of the
Fourth Amendment: “The Fourth Amendment protects ‘the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.’” 213 Justice Scalia then gave a plug to
what David Sklansky has called the Court’s new Fourth Amendment
originalism: 214
In determining whether a particular governmental action violates this provision, we
inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under
the common law when the Amendment was framed. Where that inquiry yields no
answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of
reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 215

Looking to early common law history, Justice Scalia found that the
search of Houghton’s purse was lawful because customs officials in the
eighteenth century had the right to search containers on ships and vessels
without a warrant. Notwithstanding the fact that there is a big difference
between a ship that carries many passengers and their cargo and a car that is
owned and operated by a single individual for that individual’s personal
use, Justice Scalia explained:
[T]he Framers would have regarded such a search as reasonable in light of legislation
enacted by Congress from 1789 through 1799—as well as subsequent legislation from
the founding era and beyond—that empowered customs officials to search any ship or
vessel without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe that it contained goods
subject to a duty . . . . During virtually the entire history of our country—whether
contraband was transported in a horse-drawn carriage, a 1921 roadster, or a modern
automobile—it has been assumed that a lawful search of the vehicle would include a
search of any container that might conceal the object of the search. 216

Justice Scalia concluded that if an officer has probable cause to search
a car, he can examine any and all containers within the car that might hold
the object of the search without needing a particularized showing of
probable cause for each container. 217 Under this reasoning, the warrantless
search of Houghton’s purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment even

213

Id. at 299.
David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1739, 1760 (2000) (“The full Court had hinted at sympathy for Scalia’s new Fourth
Amendment originalism in Wilson v. Arkansas, and finally embraced it in Wyoming v.
Houghton.”).
215
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299–300.
216
Id. at 300–01.
217
Id. at 302 (“When there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is
reasonable for police officers—like customs officials in the founding era—to examine
packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each one.”).
214
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though the officer had no reason to suspect the passenger was hiding drugs
or contraband in her purse.
Interestingly, Justice Scalia drew a distinction between searches of
passengers (searches of the person) and searches of property belonging to
passengers, suggesting that the heightened expectations of privacy that
attend to one’s person do not attend to one’s property and that a warrant
might be required for a search of a passenger’s person. 218 Justice Breyer,
concurring in Houghton, went further and opined that property found on a
passenger’s person, such as a wallet in a male passenger’s pants pocket or a
purse carried by a female passenger, should be treated differently than
property found at a distance from the passenger.219 Justice Breyer viewed
the search of a wallet or a purse carried by a passenger as a search of the
person, rather than as merely a search of property. 220 As of the writing of
this Article, the full Court has not yet decided whether a warrant is required
for the search of a container found on the person of the passenger when the
officer has probable cause to believe the car contains contraband or
evidence of a crime incriminating the driver, but no probable cause specific
to the container.
In sum, under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, an
officer with probable cause to believe there is contraband or evidence of a
crime within a motor vehicle 221 may search that vehicle and any containers
within that could contain the object of the search.222 Without any further
justification, the officer can even search a container belonging to a
passenger that is not directly on the passenger’s person as long as the object
of the search might be hidden in that container.223 If the probable cause is
specific to a container in a car, the officer can search the container without a
warrant but may not search anywhere else in the car.224

218
Id. at 303 (distinguishing the instant case from United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581
(1948) and Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) on the ground that those two cases
involved searches of persons whereas this case involved a search of property).
219
Id. at 308 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“But I can say that it would matter if a woman’s
purse, like a man’s billfold, were attached to her person. It might then amount to a kind of
‘outer clothing’ . . . . In this case, the purse was separate from the person . . . .”).
220
Id.
221
The Court has held that a motor home parked on a public street is a motor vehicle for
purposes of the automobile exception. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1985).
222
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (“The police may search an
automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe
contraband or evidence is contained.”).
223
Houghton, 526 U.S. at 302.
224
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 579–80.
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C. CONSENT SEARCHES

Another way police can search a container without a warrant despite
the Container Doctrine is by obtaining consent to search the general area
where the container is found. Consent to search a car has been construed by
the Supreme Court to include consent to search unlocked containers within
the car that could hold the object of the search.225 A consent search is valid
as long as the consent is given voluntarily. 226 It is not necessary for the
officer to tell the individual of his or her right to refuse consent.227
In Florida v. Jimeno, the Court established the reasonable person test
used today for determining the scope of an individual’s consent to search. 228
The Court also made it easier for a police officer who obtains consent to
search a car to search a container within the car even when the owner of the
car does not explicitly consent to a search of the container.229
In Florida v. Jimeno, an officer overheard the defendant, Enio Jimeno,
arrange “what appeared to be a drug transaction over a public telephone.” 230
When Jimeno drove away, the officer followed. After seeing Jimeno turn
right on red without stopping, the officer pulled Jimeno over to issue a
traffic citation.231 The officer told Jimeno that he was being stopped for
225

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251–52 (1991).
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
227
Id. at 231. For an excellent critique of the Court’s consent jurisprudence and an
argument that consent searches should be completely banned, see Marcy Strauss,
Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211 (2002). See also Tracey
Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39
MCGEORGE L. REV. 27 (2008) (arguing that whenever a person refuses to provide consent,
that refusal should bar further attempts by the police to seek consent); Janice Nadler, No
Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153
(applying insights from social psychology to the question of whether one can voluntarily
consent to a search requested by a police officer); Dana Raigrodski, Consent Engendered: A
Feminist Critique of Consensual Fourth Amendment Searches, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J.
37 (2004) (arguing that the consent doctrine is flawed because the Court constructs the
notion of consent from a male perspective); Josephine Ross, Blaming the Victim: ‘Consent’
Within the Fourth Amendment and Rape Law, 26 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1
(2010) (applying insights from the feminist critique of rape law to the doctrine of consent in
the Fourth Amendment arena); Nirej Sekhon, Willing Suspects and Docile Defendants: The
Contradictory Role of Consent in Criminal Procedure, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (using political theory to challenge the Court’s broad interpretation of
the concept of consent in the search, confession, and plea contexts) (manuscript at 1) (on file
with author).
228
Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251. The test asks what the typical reasonable person would have
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect. Id.
229
Id. at 252 (stating that reasonableness does not require police officers to “separately
request permission to search each container”).
230
Id. at 249.
231
Id.
226
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committing a traffic violation and that he had reason to believe Jimeno was
carrying narcotics, and then asked for permission to search Jimeno’s car. 232
Jimeno told the officer he had nothing to hide and gave the officer
permission to search the car. 233 The officer saw a brown paper bag on the
floorboard of the car, opened it, and found a kilogram of cocaine within. 234
Jimeno was charged with possession with intent to distribute
cocaine. 235 Before trial, he moved to suppress the cocaine found inside the
paper bag on the ground that his “consent to search the car did not extend to
the closed paper bag inside of the car.” 236 The trial court granted the
motion to suppress, finding that the defendant’s consent to search the car
did not include consent to search the paper bag inside the car. 237 The
Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that “consent to a
general search for narcotics does not extend to sealed containers within the
general area agreed to by the defendant.” 238 The Florida Supreme Court
affirmed. 239
Writing for the Court in 1991, Chief Justice Rehnquist began his
analysis by embracing the Separate Clauses view of the Fourth
Amendment, opining that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness.” 240 He continued by stating, “The Fourth Amendment does
not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes
those which are unreasonable.” 241
With this focus on reasonableness, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained
that a court trying to measure the scope of a suspect’s consent should apply
an objective reasonableness standard and ask: “what would the typical
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and
the suspect?” 242 Despite the fact that all three of the Florida courts that had
considered Jimeno’s motion to suppress found that Jimeno’s consent to
search the car did not mean he was giving consent to search the paper bag
inside the car, the Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Florida on the ground that a reasonable person would have understood the
exchange between the officer and Jimeno to mean that Jimeno had
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242

Id.
Id. at 249–50.
Id. at 250.
Id.
Id.
Id.
State v. Jimeno, 550 So. 2d 1176, 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
State v. Jimeno, 564 So. 2d 1083 (1990).
Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250.
Id.
Id. at 251.
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consented to a search of the paper bag. 243 Justice Rehnquist explained that
in light of the fact that the officer had informed Jimeno that he believed
Jimeno was carrying drugs, it was objectively reasonable for the officer to
conclude that Jimeno’s general consent to search the car included his
specific consent to search any containers within the car that might contain
drugs. 244 Justice Rehnquist further noted that “[a] reasonable person may
be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of
container,” not “strewn across the trunk or floor of the car.” 245
In his dissent, Justice Marshall pointed out that “[b]y the same logic a
person who consents to a search of the car . . . could also be deemed to
consent to a search of his person or indeed of his body cavities, since a
reasonable person may be expected to know that drug couriers frequently
store their contraband on their persons or in their body cavities,” 246 yet a
reasonable person would probably understand that a person who consents to
a search of his car for drugs does not consent to a search of his person for
drugs. 247 Justice Marshall reminded the Court that just as individuals have
heightened expectations of privacy in their persons, they have heightened
expectations of privacy in their containers.248
In an interesting departure from previous Court statements about
whether the Court should draw a distinction between locked and unlocked
containers, 249 Justice Rehnquist suggested that a locked briefcase might be
treated differently than a closed paper bag, writing, “It is very likely
unreasonable to think that a suspect, by consenting to the search of his
trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase within the
trunk, but it is otherwise with respect to a closed paper bag.” 250 While
Justice Rehnquist did not explain why he thought it would be unreasonable
to think that consent to search a car would include consent to search a
locked container within the car, one obvious reason is the heightened
expectation of privacy one presumably has in the contents of a container
that one has gone to the trouble of locking.
Justice Rehnquist’s suggestion that a locked briefcase is entitled to
more protection than a closed paper bag was contrary to previous
243

Id. at 250–51.
Id. at 251.
245
Id. (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 (1982)).
246
Id. at 255 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
247
Id.
248
Id. at 253.
249
See Ross, 456 U.S. 822 (noting that the Court was in unanimous agreement in
Robbins v. California that a constitutional distinction between “worthy” and “unworthy”
containers would be improper).
250
Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251–52.
244
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pronouncements by the Court on this issue. As Justice Marshall pointed out
in his dissent, the Court “has soundly rejected any distinction between
‘worthy’ containers, like locked briefcases, and ‘unworthy’ containers, like
paper bags.” 251 Quoting from United States v. Ross, Justice Marshall noted:
For just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same
guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion, so also may a traveler who
carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf claim
an equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated
executive with the locked attaché case. 252

Florida v. Jimeno establishes that when an officer specifies what he is
looking for, consent to search one’s car includes consent to search unlocked
containers within the car that could be concealing the object of the
search. 253 At least one state court has held that when an officer at a safety
roadblock fails to specify the object of his search, an individual’s
unrestricted consent to search his car does not extend to containers within
the car. 254 Accordingly, a person who consents to a police search of his car
for drugs consents to letting the officer search unlocked containers within
the car that might contain drugs. 255
D. THE TERRY STOP AND FRISK DOCTRINE

1. Terry v. Ohio’s Embrace of the Separate Clauses/Reasonableness
Approach
The Terry stop and frisk doctrine provides another avenue for
warrantless searches of containers carried by persons on the street.256
Although the Terry decision did not involve a container search, subsequent
cases have extended Terry to cover such searches. 257 In Terry v. Ohio, the
Court held that an officer can stop, i.e., briefly detain, an individual based
upon a particularized suspicion, later deemed “reasonable suspicion,” of
251

Id. at 254 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 822).
253
Id. at 251.
254
See State v. Sargent, 984 A.2d 831, 834–35 (Me. 2009).
255
While Jimeno involved consent to search a car, one can see how the reasoning of
Jimeno could be extended to the home such that a homeowner’s consent to search a home
could be construed to include consent to search any unlocked containers in the home that
might contain the object of the search.
256
For enlightening discussion and critique of the Terry stop and frisk doctrine, see
Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423 (2004);
Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality
Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053 (1998); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual
Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 NYU L. REV. 956 (1999).
257
See infra text accompanying notes 271–291.
252
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criminal activity. 258 Furthermore, if the officer can point to specific and
articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable belief that the individual stopped
is armed and dangerous, the officer can conduct a limited pat-down frisk of
the individual to make sure he cannot access a weapon that he could use
against the officer. 259 The sole purpose of a Terry frisk must be to look for
weapons, not contraband or evidence of a crime. 260
The Terry decision, written in 1968—before the Court established the
Container Doctrine—signaled the Court’s early willingness to view the two
clauses of the Fourth Amendment as separate and independent, rather than
interconnected, clauses. Writing for a nearly unanimous court, Chief
Justice Earl Warren quoted the words of the Fourth Amendment, 261 then
noted, “[W]hat the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but
unreasonable searches and seizures.” 262 Later in the opinion, he remarked
that “the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment [is] the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental
invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” 263
The Terry Court did not completely abandon its prior embrace of the
Warrant Preference view. 264 It sought to explain its adoption of the

258

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1968). As Lewis Katz notes, “Chief Justice
Warren’s majority opinion [in Terry v. Ohio] never used the term ‘reasonable suspicion,’
instead writing of ‘unusual conduct’ which leads a police officer ‘reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.’” Katz, supra note 256, at 486
(“It was only in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Sibron that the ‘reasonable suspicion’
standard was articulated.”) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)).
259
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (“Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in
this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit
a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer; where he has reason
to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether
he has probable cause to arrest the individual . . . .”). In his concurring opinion, Justice
Harlan clarified that the officer must first have the right to stop the individual before he can
frisk him. Id. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he officer must first have constitutional
grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop.”). If the officer reasonably
suspects that the person is engaging or has engaged in a crime of violence, the right to frisk
flows automatically from the right to stop the individual. Id. at 33 (“[T]he right to frisk must
be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is, as here, an articulable suspicion of a
crime of violence.”).
260
Id. at 29 (“The sole justification of the search . . . is the protection of the police officer
and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably
designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the
police officer.”).
261
Id. at 8.
262
Id. at 9 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
263
Id. at 19.
264
Id. at 20.
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Reasonableness view by claiming that the case before it did not involve
police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment:
We do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, or
that in most instances failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be
excused by exigent circumstances. But we deal here with an entire rubric of police
conduct—necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the
officer on the beat—which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could
not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct involved in this case
must be tested by the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 265

The Terry Court’s embrace of the Reasonableness view of the Fourth
Amendment was a clear departure from precedent. As Earl C. Dudley, Jr.,
who was one of Chief Justice Earl Warren’s law clerks at the time Terry
was decided, notes, “[T]he Court had historically read the Fourth
Amendment’s two clauses in pari materia [i.e., construed together]. The
Warrant Clause’s standard of ‘probable cause’ had been taken to define the
‘reasonableness’ of a search and seizure, even where obtaining a warrant
was excused as impracticable.” 266
Surprisingly, it was Justice Brennan, known as one of the most liberal
Justices on the Court and a staunch defender of the Warrant Preference
view, 267 who first suggested that the two clauses in the Fourth Amendment
should be read as separate and distinct commands. 268 Dudley notes that it
was Justice Brennan who argued that “[i]n a context—swiftly developing
265

Id. (citations omitted).
Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, the Warren Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A
Law Clerk’s Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 891, 894 (1998).
267
See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 143 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“The Amendment protects [the interest in privacy and the possessory interest in property] in
precisely the same manner: by requiring a neutral and detached magistrate to evaluate,
before the search or seizure, the government’s showing of probable cause and its particular
description of the place to be searched and the items to be seized.”); United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 552 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Though the
Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’ the definition of
‘reasonableness’ turns, at least in part, on the more specific commands of the warrant
clause.”) (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972) (internal
quotation omitted); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 774 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“I suppose one should be grateful that the Court has not explicitly opened one more breach
in the general rule that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”) (quoting
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)).
268
Dudley, supra note 266, at 894 (“It was Justice Brennan who suggested, after the
initial Warren draft had sat for several weeks without collecting any votes, what emerged
eventually as the doctrinal solution—the analytical separation of the amendment’s two
clauses.”).
266
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street encounters—where obtaining a warrant was inherently
impracticable . . . the strictures of the Warrant Clause were simply
inapplicable, and the definition of a ‘reasonable’ search could and should be
cut free from the standard of ‘probable cause.’” 269 Justice Brennan’s
suggestion was incorporated into the final draft of the Terry opinion, and
prompted Justice Douglas to dissent. 270
2. The Plain Feel Exception Extended to Cover Container Searches
The Container Doctrine has further been eroded by the Court’s
recognition of a plain feel exception to the warrant requirement. In 1993,
the Court in Minnesota v. Dickerson extended the plain view doctrine 271 to
the sense of touch, holding that when an officer conducting a lawful Terry
frisk feels an object whose incriminating character is immediately apparent
and the officer has probable cause to believe the object is (or contains)
contraband or evidence of a crime, the officer may seize that object without
stopping to get a warrant. 272 Under the plain feel exception, evidence may
be admitted if (1) the officer had a lawful right of access to the item as he
would if he were conducting a lawful Terry stop, 273 (2) the officer had
probable cause to believe the item is (or contains) contraband or evidence of
a crime, 274 and (3) the incriminating nature of the item was immediately
269

Id.
Id. at 895.
271
See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323, 326–27 (1987) (explaining the plain view
doctrine).
272
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1993). In Dickerson, two police
officers were patrolling a neighborhood at night in a marked police car. They saw a man
leaving an apartment building known to the officers as a crack house. The man began
walking towards the officers, but upon seeing the squad car and making eye contact with one
of the officers, abruptly halted and began walking in the opposite direction. Based on the
man’s evasive actions and the fact that he had just left a building known for cocaine
trafficking, the officers decided to stop and frisk the man. During the frisk, one officer felt a
lump in the man’s front pocket. After squeezing, sliding, and otherwise manipulating the
contents of the man’s pocket with his fingers, the officer determined that the lump was crack
cocaine wrapped in cellophane. The officer reached into the defendant’s pocket and pulled
out a small plastic bag containing a fifth of a gram of crack cocaine. The defendant was
arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance. Before trial, the defendant
moved to suppress the drugs found during the pat-down frisk. Id. at 368–69.
273
Id. at 375 (“If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels
an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no
invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for
weapons . . . .”).
274
Id. at 376 (“Regardless of whether the officer detects the contraband by sight or by
touch, however, the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that the officer have probable cause to
believe that the item is contraband before seizing it ensures against excessively speculative
seizures.”).
270
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apparent to the officer. 275 Because the officer in Dickerson had to squeeze
and manipulate the lump in order to determine that it was a baggy filled
with cocaine, the incriminating character of the object in this case was not
immediately apparent to the officer, and the seizure of the cocaine was
deemed unconstitutional. 276
Ironically, the Dickerson Court endorsed the Warrant Preference view
of the Fourth Amendment, noting “[t]ime and again, this Court has
observed that searches and seizures ‘conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically
established and well delineated exceptions.’” 277 Even though the search at
issue did not fall within a specifically established and well-delineated
exception, the Court created a new exception to the warrant requirement—
the plain feel exception—then found that the search in question failed to
meet the requirements of this new exception. 278
Although Dickerson spoke only to the lawfulness of the seizure of an
object found during a lawful Terry frisk, lower courts have relied upon
Dickerson to permit searches as well as seizures of containers found on a
suspect during a lawful Terry frisk. 279 For example, in Ball v. United
States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that drugs found in a
large medicine bottle during the course of a lawful Terry frisk were
admissible under the plain feel doctrine even though touching alone could
not have revealed the presence of contraband inside the medicine bottle.280
Ball was a passenger in a vehicle stopped because it lacked a front
license plate.281 The officer who stopped the car noticed that Ball kept
reaching toward his jacket’s center pocket even though the officer kept
telling him not to do so.282 When Ball reached for his jacket pocket for a
third time, the officer decided to frisk him. During the frisk, the officer
275

Id. at 379 (“Although the officer was lawfully in a position to feel the lump in
respondent’s pocket, because Terry entitled him to place his hands upon respondent’s jacket,
the court below determined that the incriminating character of the object was not
immediately apparent to him.”).
276
Id.
277
Id. at 372 (quoting Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19–20 (1984)) (internal
quotes omitted).
278
Id. at 375.
279
See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 129 F.3d 76, 79–80 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76, 377, 378 (1993)) (affirming district court’s
ruling that admission of cocaine found in paper bag removed from defendant during a patdown frisk was proper).
280
Ball v. United States, 803 A.2d 971, 982 (D.C. 2002).
281
Id. at 973.
282
Id.
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“felt a large cylinder container which [he] thought to be a large medicine
bottle.” 283 The officer testified that he immediately thought “it was some
kind of contraband or narcotics because [Ball had] made several attempts to
go into his pocket and remove it.” 284 The officer removed the medicine
bottle from Ball’s pocket, opened it, and found a number of Ziploc bags
containing a white rock-like substance, which turned out to be drugs. 285
Ball was charged with unlawful possession with intent to distribute a
controlled substance. 286 Before trial, Ball moved to suppress the drugs
found in the medicine bottle on the ground that the officer had exceeded the
scope of a lawful Terry frisk. 287 At the suppression hearing, the officer
testified that he had been involved in more than 100 drug-related arrests,
that he was familiar with the ways drugs are packaged and hidden, and that
he had arrested many people who hid illegal narcotics in medicine
bottles. 288 The trial court found that Ball’s actions gave the officer a
reasonable basis to believe Ball might be armed, justifying a Terry frisk for
weapons. 289 Conflating the immediately apparent requirement with the
probable cause requirement, the trial court found that the object in Ball’s
pocket was immediately apparent to the officer as a medicine bottle and that
the officer had probable cause to believe the medicine bottle contained
narcotics given “the combination of feeling the bottle, knowing it was a
bottle, the size of the bottle, the experience of the officer with regard to the
packaging of narcotics in this kind of container and the defendant’s
actions.” 290 Even though it could not have been immediately apparent to
the officer that the hard cylindrical container he felt contained contraband
as opposed to vitamins or some other lawful substance, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that in light of Ball’s
suspicious conduct and the officer’s extensive experience with the practices
of drug traffickers, the officer had probable cause to believe there were
illegal drugs in the medicine bottle and therefore the warrantless search of
the medicine bottle was justified under the plain feel doctrine.291
283

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
285
See id.
286
Id. at 972.
287
Id. at 974.
288
Id. at 973.
289
Id. at 973–74.
290
Id. at 974.
291
Id. In contrast, the Alabama Supreme Court found that the warrantless search of a Tic
Tac box found during a lawful Terry frisk was not justified under the plain feel doctrine even
though the police officer who conducted the search testified that in previous cases, he had
come across the same type of plastic container and the containers in those cases had
concealed drugs. Ex parte Warren, 783 So. 2d 86, 88 (Ala. 2000). The Alabama Supreme
284
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The trial court was correct to find there was reasonable suspicion to
support the frisk. Ball kept trying to reach for something in his jacket
pocket even though the officer told him not to do so. The officer could
have reasonably believed Ball was trying to reach for a weapon. The court,
however, erroneously found that the warrantless search of the medicine
bottle was justified under the plain feel doctrine. While the officer may
have had reasonable grounds to believe that there were drugs in the
medicine bottle, its contents could not have been immediately apparent to
the officer. When the officer found the medicine bottle, he should have
seized it and then sought a warrant to search it. Once the medicine bottle
was within the officer’s exclusive possession and control, there was little
danger that Ball could have obtained a weapon or destroyed any evidence
within the container.
3. Conflating the Reasonable Suspicion Needed to Stop with the Reasonable
Suspicion Needed to Frisk and Extending Terry to Include Frisks of
Containers on the Person
One problem with the Terry stop and frisk doctrine is that courts often
conflate the justification required for a stop with the justification required
for a frisk. As discussed earlier, an officer may stop an individual if the
officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal
activity or has committed a traffic violation. 292 Once the officer has
lawfully stopped an individual, he may then conduct a limited pat-down
frisk of the individual if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the
individual is armed and dangerous. 293 In other words, the officer needs two

Court held that the drugs in the Tic Tac box had to be excluded because the incriminating
character of the contents of the hard-shell container could not have been immediately
apparent to the officer and the officer could not have had probable cause to believe the
container contained contraband before he opened it. Id. at 94. The court recognized that
there is a split of authority amongst the lower courts over whether the seizure of a container
such as a Tic Tac box, matchbox, pill bottle, or film container complies with the
requirements of the plain feel doctrine. Id. at 93. After reviewing the relevant cases, the
court concluded that the better reasoned view was that it did not: “if the object detected by
the officers touched during a Terry search is a hard-shell, closed container, then the
incriminating nature of any contents of that container cannot be immediately apparent to the
officer until he seizes it and opens it. In such a situation, the officer cannot satisfy the
Dickerson requirement that the officer have probable cause to believe, before seizing it, that
the object is contraband.” Id. at 94.
292
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968); see also Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct.
781, 784 (2009) (holding that the first Terry requirement, a lawful investigative stop, is met
whenever a police officer has the lawful authority to detain a car and its occupants for a
traffic violation and that “police need not have, in addition, cause to believe any occupant of
the vehicle is involved in criminal activity”).
293
Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.
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different justifications to stop and frisk an individual. He needs reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity to stop the individual, and he needs
reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and dangerous in order to
frisk him. The only time the officer’s right to frisk flows automatically
from the right to stop is when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the
individual is involved in a crime of violence.294
In several cases, the Court has conflated these two requirements. For
example, in Minnesota v. Dickerson, the Court assumed that the officers
had reason to suspect that Dickerson was involved in criminal activity and
was armed and dangerous. The Court’s conclusion that the officers had a
reasonable suspicion that Dickerson was involved in criminal activity was
not problematic. Dickerson had just left a notorious crack house and had
tried to avoid the officers when he saw them. 295 The officers could have
reasonably concluded that these actions suggested Dickerson had just
engaged in a drug transaction. However, it was a stretch to conclude that
these same facts gave the officers reasonable suspicion that Dickerson was
armed and dangerous unless one believes that all low-level drug users carry
guns. Indeed, in an earlier case, the Court acknowledged that just because
one associates with narcotics addicts does not mean one is armed and
dangerous. 296
In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Court again assumed the officers in
question had both reasonable suspicion to stop and reasonable suspicion to
frisk, 297 when arguably all the officers had was reasonable suspicion to stop.
In Wardlow, two uniformed officers in a police caravan patrolling a high
crime neighborhood known for drug dealing spotted Wardlow standing next
294

Id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 368–69 (1993).
296
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63–64 (1968). In finding the frisk in question
unlawful, the Sibron Court noted, “The suspect’s mere act of talking with a number of
known narcotics addicts over an eight hour period no more gives rise to reasonable fear of
life or limb on the part of the police officer than it justifies an arrest for committing a crime.”
Id. at 64. Some lower courts have opined that drug dealers often carry weapons, supporting
the view that reasonable suspicion that an individual is a drug dealer gives rise to reasonable
suspicion that the individual is also armed and dangerous. See, e.g., United States v. Salazar,
945 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1991). In Dickerson, however, the officers had no reason to suspect
Dickerson was a drug dealer as opposed to merely a buyer or user of drugs. See Stanley A.
Goldman, To Flee or Not to Flee—That Is the Question: Flight as Furtive Gesture, 37 IDAHO
L. REV. 557, 575 (2001) (noting “[t]hat Mr. Dickerson was thus a drug suspect appears to be
the only . . . basis for the officers’ belief that he was armed and posed a danger”); see also
David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped
and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 676 (1994) (noting that courts often “fail to distinguish
between drug use or possession on the one hand and drug trafficking on the other for
purposes of judging whether the defendant might be armed.”).
297
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).
295

2010]

THE DISAPPEARING CONTAINER DOCTRINE

1455

to a building holding an opaque bag. 298 Wardlow looked in the direction of
the officers, then turned the other way and started to run. 299 The officers
chased Wardlow and when they caught up with him, one officer frisked him
and found a gun in the bag he was holding. 300 Wardlow was charged with
unlawful use of a firearm by a convicted felon, and filed a motion to
suppress the gun found during the stop and frisk. 301
Wardlow is usually cited for the proposition that flight from police
officers alone is not sufficient for reasonable suspicion, but flight from
police officers plus something else, like being in a high crime
neighborhood, can give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to
stop an individual. 302 What is interesting about Wardlow, however, is the
fact that the Court did not spend any appreciable time discussing whether
the police officers who frisked Wardlow had the required reasonable
suspicion to believe Wardlow was armed and dangerous. Wardlow was not
a case where the officers had reason to suspect Wardlow of a crime of
violence, so unless one subscribes to the view that wherever there are drugs,
there are guns, the officers at most had reason to suspect Wardlow was
involved in a drug crime, but no reason to suspect he was armed and
dangerous. 303
Moreover, in allowing the gun found in the bag Wardlow was holding
to be admitted into evidence, the Wardlow decision suggested that a Terry
frisk includes not just a limited pat-down of the outer clothing of the
suspect, but also a search of any containers the suspect is carrying on his
person. 304 The Court in Terry never said that a frisk of the person includes
a frisk of containers, but Wardlow implies that a frisk of the person includes
298

Id. at 121–22.
Id. at 122.
300
Id.
301
Id.
302
See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 251 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Wardlow
for the proposition that a suspect’s nervous, evasive behavior or flight from police alone may
be insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, but might corroborate an otherwise
insufficient tip); United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Wardlow
for the proposition that “flight upon noticing police, plus some other indicia of wrongdoing,
can constitute reasonable suspicion”); United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 41 (1st Cir. 2001)
(citing Wardlow in noting that “[a]n individual’s flight from police combined with other
observations by a police officer may support reasonable suspicion sufficient for detention
under Terry”).
303
The officer said he frisked Wardlow because in his experience, it was common for
there to be weapons in the near vicinity of drug transactions. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 122.
304
In reversing the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court which had affirmed the trial
court’s decision to suppress the gun, Wardlow could be read as approving the frisk of
Wardlow. In a footnote, however, the Wardlow Court stated, “We express no opinion as to
the lawfulness of the frisk independently of the stop.” Id. at 124 n.2.
299
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a frisk of containers on the person. On the one hand, concern for officer
safety supports allowing an officer who is patting down a suspect for
weapons to search containers on the suspect’s person that might contain a
weapon. On the other hand, once the officer seizes the container and has it
under his exclusive possession and control, the chance that the suspect will
be able to access a weapon within the container is substantially diminished.
This overlooked extension of the Terry stop and frisk doctrine in Wardlow
brings the Terry doctrine closer to the search incident to arrest doctrine and
its treatment of containers found either on or near the arrestee’s person.305
4. Terry Frisks of the Car and Containers Within the Car
The Terry stop and frisk doctrine further undermines the Container
Doctrine by allowing police officers to conduct warrantless searches of the
passenger compartment of the car when they reasonably suspect that the
individual stopped is dangerous and may gain access to a weapon in the
car. 306 In such a case, the officer may conduct a Terry frisk of the
passenger compartment of the car for weapons.307 The Terry frisk of the car
may include a search of any containers within the passenger compartment
that might contain a weapon. 308
E. ADMINISTRATIVE (A.K.A SPECIAL NEEDS) SEARCHES

Another way police officers may engage in warrantless container
searches is through the administrative search exception, also known as the

305

When the Court upheld the warrantless search of a crumpled up cigarette package
found in an arrestee’s shirt pocket as a search incident to arrest in United States v. Robinson,
Justice Marshall dissented, arguing that once the officer seized the cigarette package, the
container was in his exclusive possession and control and there was no danger that the
arrestee could gain access to a weapon or evidence within the package. 414 U.S. 218, 256
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Rejecting Justice Marshall’s suggestion that the officer
should have gotten a warrant before opening the package, the Robinson Court said that since
Robinson was validly arrested, the officer had the right to conduct a full search of
Robinson’s person, including any packages or containers found on him. Id. at 236. Because
Robinson had already been subjected to a full custodial arrest, any further intrusion into his
privacy interests were minimal. Id. at 235. This rationale for allowing officers to conduct
warrantless searches of containers found on an arrestee’s person, however, does not apply
when an officer finds a container on the person of an individual stopped on suspicion of
criminal activity, but not arrested. The reason we allow officers to conduct stops and frisks
upon less than probable cause is because the intrusion on privacy and liberty is supposedly
much less than the intrusion on privacy and liberty when a person is arrested and taken into
custody. Id. In suggesting that the frisk of Wardlow and the search of the paper bag he was
holding was lawful, the Wardlow Court elided this distinction between stops and arrests.
306
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983).
307
Id.
308
Id.
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special needs exception. 309 The administrative search exception is an
umbrella exception which includes, inter alia, border searches, inventory
searches, vehicle checkpoint searches, government employee searches,
prisoner searches, and searches of high school students. It has been used to
validate a high school principal’s warrantless search of a student’s purse, 310
the warrantless search of a government employee’s office,311 and the
warrantless search of a backpack found in a van impounded by a police
officer. 312
Under the administrative search doctrine, the court first evaluates
whether the government has a special need, above and beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, to engage in the search. 313 If so, then the court
balances the government’s interests against the individual’s interest in
privacy, and decides whether the government’s interests outweigh the
individual’s interest. 314 In its administrative search jurisprudence, the Court
most clearly reflects its embrace of the Reasonableness view of the Fourth
Amendment, for the ultimate inquiry in every administrative search case is
whether the search is reasonable. 315 Critics of the special needs exception
have pointed out that in virtually every case where the Court has found a
special need, it has ruled in favor of the government, finding that the
governmental interests outweighed the individual’s interest. 316
309
For more detailed discussion of the Court’s administrative search jurisprudence, see
Fabio Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference: Suspicionless Civil Searches in the
Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1223 (2004) (arguing against an individualized
suspicion requirement in the administrative search context); Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of
Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U.
MEM. L. REV. 483, 544–618 (1995) (arguing that individualized suspicion should be a
component of reasonableness analysis even in administrative search cases); William J.
Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV.
553 (1992) (arguing that the Court should follow a contracts model in the special needs
context, asking what kind of search rule the government and innocent targets would adopt if
negotiating such a rule in advance).
310
See New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
311
See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
312
See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
313
Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public,
1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 109 (noting that as a threshold inquiry, the Court asks whether
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable
cause requirements impracticable).
314
Id.
315
Id.
316
See, e.g., Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, “Special Needs” and the Fourth Amendment:
An Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
529, 551 (1997) (“In every case where the Court has found a special need and eschewed the
requirements of a warrant and probable cause, it has concluded that the governmental
interest outweighed the privacy interest . . . .”); see also Arcila, supra note 309, at 1224 (“In
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The administrative search exception was used to uphold checkpoints
set up by the New York Police Department (NYPD) to search the
containers of New York subway riders.317 In response to a series of attacks
on the London subway and bus systems in July 2005, the NYPD established
a Container Inspection Program to deter terrorists from carrying explosives
on to New York’s subway system and to uncover any such attempts.318
Under this program, the NYPD established container inspection
checkpoints at selected subway facilities where uniformed officers would
search the bags of a portion of individuals entering the subway station. 319
In MacWade v. Kelly, the Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality
of NYPD’s Container Inspection Program against a Fourth Amendment
challenge. 320 Subway riders represented by the New York Civil Liberties
Union sued Raymond Kelly, commissioner of the NYPD, and the City of
New York, arguing that NYPD’s Container Inspection Program violated the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 321 After a two-day bench trial, Judge
all but one of the Supreme Court’s special needs cases, the Court has been deferential to
governmental justifications”); Stuntz, supra note 309, at 554 (noting that the term “special
need” is “no more than a label that indicates when a lax standard will apply.”).
317
See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006).
318
Id. at 264. A supervising sergeant established a selection rate, such as every fifth
person, based on the number of officers available and the volume of passengers at that
checkpoint. A large poster close to the table notified riders that “backpacks and other
containers [are] subject to inspection.” Announcements to the same effect were made in the
subway station and on the trains. A supervising sergeant at the checkpoint used a bullhorn to
tell subway passengers that all persons wishing to enter the station would be subject to a
container search and to warn those wishing to avoid the search to leave the station. Officers
assigned to these checkpoints were instructed to search only those containers capable of
carrying an explosive device. Once an officer identified such a container, the officer was to
limit his inspection to what was minimally necessary to ensure that the container did not
contain an explosive device. Officers were instructed to not intentionally look for
contraband other than explosives, but if an officer incidentally discovered such contraband,
he could arrest the individual carrying it. Officers were told not to attempt to read any
written or printed material. Additionally, officers were instructed not to record a passenger’s
personal information such as his or her name and address. Declining a search would not be
grounds for an arrest, although police were authorized to arrest anyone who refused to be
searched and later attempted to reenter the subway system with the uninspected container.
Id. at 264–65. NYPD set up container inspection checkpoints at least thirty-five times a year
in each of the city’s 468 subway stations. Al Baker, Subway Searches Go on Quietly, Just
How Police Like Them, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2007, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/06/nyregion/06bags.html.
319
MacWade, 460 F.3d at 265. Although where the subway checkpoints were
established seemed the result of random selection, the NYPD had reasons for selecting
certain facilities over others, reasons which they kept secret to avoid letting potential
terrorists know which subway stations would have checkpoints. Id. at 264.
320
Id. at 275.
321
Id. at 263; see also MacWade v. Kelly, 05 Civ. 6921, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31281,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2005) (noting that plaintiffs were represented by the New York Civil
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Richard Berman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York found the Container Inspection Program constitutional pursuant to the
special needs exception and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.322 The
plaintiffs appealed.
Applying special needs analysis to the case at hand, the Second Circuit
agreed with the district court’s finding that the Container Inspection
Program served the special need of preventing a terrorist attack on the
subway. 323 The court of appeals then balanced the government’s interests
against the subway riders’ interests. Despite finding that subway riders
have full, not diminished, expectations of privacy in their containers,324 the
court found that given the substantial interest in preventing a terrorist attack
on the subway, the Container Inspection Program was a reasonably
effective means of addressing the government’s interest in deterring and
detecting a terrorist attack and intruded upon subway riders’ privacy
interests only to a minimal degree.325
MacWade builds on cases upholding warrantless searches of suitcases
and other luggage at airports. Since the 1970s, lower courts have almost
uniformly held that warrantless searches of luggage at airports are
reasonable because of the government’s interest in protecting the safety of
airline passengers, a special need above and beyond the normal need for
law enforcement. 326
Liberties Union). Another lawsuit was filed against the NYPD in February 2009 by Jangir
Sultan, a thirty-two-year-old native New Yorker of Kashmiri descent who was stopped and
searched by police officers twenty-one times between July 2005, when the NYPD initiated
the subway checkpoint program, and June 2008. NYCLU Lawsuit Targets Racial Profiling
at Subway Checkpoints, NYCLU.ORG, Feb. 19, 2009, http://www.nyclu.org/node/2252/print
(last visited 5/27/2009). The New York Civil Liberties Union, representing Sultan, alleged
that Sultan’s South Asian appearance was the only factor that could explain his persistent
targeting by police officers. Id. The New York Civil Liberties Union also asserted that the
checkpoint program’s design invites racial profiling because officers are forbidden from
recording any demographic information about the people selected. Id.
322
MacWade, 460 F.3d at 263.
323
Id. at 270.
324
Id. at 272–73.
325
Id. at 275. But see Recent Case, MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006),
120 HARV. L. REV. 635 (2006) (arguing that in finding the subway checkpoint program
constitutional after determining that subjects of searches enjoyed a full expectation of
privacy in their containers, the Second Circuit diminished the role of the individual’s interest
in privacy in the special needs analysis, making it easier for future courts to find other
warrantless searches constitutional under the special needs doctrine).
326
United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500–01 (2d Cir. 1974) (upholding FAA
regulations permitting the use of metal detectors to search carry-on baggage at airports);
United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 1973) (“The courts have consistently
held airport security measures constitutionally justified as a limited and relatively
insignificant intrusion of privacy balanced against the need to protect aircraft and its
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While most people are familiar with the searches of luggage that
routinely take place at our nation’s airports, few know that government
officials are now conducting warrantless, suspicionless searches of laptops
belonging to international travelers. Since July 2008, the Department of
Homeland Security has permitted federal agents at the border or its
functional equivalent to seize electronic devices capable of storing
information in digital or analog form, such as laptop computers, cell
phones, iPods, pagers, and beepers, without a warrant for an unspecified
period of time. 327 Federal agents may copy data within these devices
without a warrant or any particularized suspicion of wrongdoing. 328 The
contents of a laptop may be shared with other agencies and private entities
for language translation or data decryption.329 Between October 2008 and
June 2010, more than 6,000 travelers have had their laptops searched under
this policy. 330
Permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of laptops is
inconsistent with the Container Doctrine’s insistence that law enforcement
officers obtain judicial authorization before searching a container. It is also
a departure from previous rules that recognized the special needs involved
in policing the border, but required probable cause to believe a crime had
been or was being committed before federal agents could copy material that
a traveler was bringing into the country. 331 Nonetheless, at least one federal
passengers.”); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973) (upholding
warrantless search of briefcase at airport given the “unquestionably grave and urgent” need
to prevent airline hijacking).
327
Ellen Nakashima, Expanded Powers to Search Travelers at Border Detailed, WASH.
POST, Sept. 23, 2008, at A2 (discussing U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION POLICY
REGARDING BORDER SEARCH OF INFORMATION (July 16, 2008); U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, BORDER SEARCHES OF DOCUMENTS AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA,
Directive No. 7-6.0 (July 16, 2008)).
328
Id.
329
Ellen Nakashima, Travelers’ Laptops May Be Detained at Border, WASH. POST, Aug.
1, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2008/08/01/AR20080080103030_pf.html.
330
Ellen Nakashima, New Lawsuit to Challenge Laptop Searches at U.S. Border, WASH.
POST, Sept. 7, 2010, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/
article/2010/09/07/AR2010090700845.html.
331
Nakashima, supra note 327, at A1. Laptop computers often contain highly sensitive
personal information, including financial and medical information. If one uses a laptop to
surf the internet, a history of websites visited may be revealed during a search. See Orin S.
Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 543 (2005) (noting
that browsers used to surf the World Wide Web are typically programmed to automatically
retain information about websites users have visited in recent weeks and that users can use
this history to retrace their steps or find webpages previously visited); Editorial, Search and
Replace: Congress Needs to Set the Rules for How Border Agents Can Delve into Travelers’
Laptops, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2008, at A14, available at http://www.washingtonpost/
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circuit court of appeals has upheld a warrantless, suspicionless search of a
laptop under the border search doctrine, rejecting the argument that laptops,
like homes, are repositories of highly personal information. 332 Whether
laptop computers and other electronic devices should be treated like
traditional portable containers is a question that has divided the lower
courts. 333

wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/12/AF200808120202744-pf.html. While the governmental
need to protect the safety of the nation against the threat of terrorism is a weighty one, it is
not clear that allowing federal agents to search all laptops at the border without any reason to
suspect that the laptop owner is engaging in or has engaged in terrorism or criminal activity
is necessary or appropriate in light of the significant intrusion on privacy interests that such
searches entail.
332
See United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Arnold’s analogy
to a search of a home based on a laptop’s storage capacity is without merit.”); see also
United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005) (refusing to recognize a First
Amendment exception to the border search doctrine in cases involving laptops). But see
Christine A. Coletta, Note, Laptop Searches at the United States Borders and the Border
Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 48 B.C. L. REV. 971 (2007) (arguing that laptop
searches at the border should be predicated by reasonable suspicion); Ari B. Fontecchio,
Note, Suspicionless Laptop Searches Under the Border Search Doctrine: The Fourth
Amendment Exception that Swallows Your Laptop, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 231 (2009) (arguing
that suspicionless laptop searches at the border compromise border security by diverting
attention from the more important task of preventing the entry of weapons); Marianne Leach,
Note, Fliers Beware: The Ninth Circuit Decision, United States v. Arnold, Granted Customs
Agents Access Into Your Laptops, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 307 (2009) (arguing that
reasonable suspicion should be required before government officials search laptops at the
border). In September 2010, the ACLU filed a lawsuit against the Department of Homeland
Security, arguing that its laptop search policy violates the Fourth Amendment. Press
Release, ACLU, Abidor v. Napolitano: The ACLU Challenges Suspicionless Laptop Border
Policy (Sept. 15, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/free-speech-technology-andliberty/abidor-v-napolitano; Nakashima, supra note 330.
333
See, e.g., People v. Emerson, 766 N.Y.S.2d 482, 487, 490 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (treating
computers and computer files as closed containers); United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d
929, 936–37 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protection of closed computer
files and hard drives is similar to the protection it affords a person’s closed containers.”);
United States v. David, 756 F. Supp. 1385, 1391 (D. Nev. 1991) (treating handheld computer
memo book as a container). But see United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th
Cir. 1998) (rejecting defendant’s argument that his computer disks and hard drive were the
equivalent of closed containers, and therefore absent exigent circumstances, the government
needed a search warrant to search his computer); see also Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth
Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75
MISS. L.J. 193, 195 (2005) (arguing that computers are containers and that computer
searches should be treated just like other container searches). The government’s laptop
search policy in essence treats laptop computers like containers that are routinely searched at
airports.
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F. INVENTORY SEARCHES

Another way law enforcement officials can search a container without
a warrant is through an inventory search. When an officer takes a person or
vehicle into custody, police department regulations may authorize the
officer to take an inventory of property taken from the individual or vehicle.
Those regulations may allow the officer to open closed containers so that
the contents of the containers can be inventoried. While inventory searches
are a type of administrative search, I discuss them separately because the
Court has specified a set of criteria that must be met for an inventory search
to be valid, which differs from the usual special needs plus balancing
inquiry that is conducted in most administrative search cases.
In order for an inventory search to be valid, the officer (1) must have
been acting in accordance with standardized criteria, 334 and (2) must not
have acted in bad faith, i.e., for the sole purpose of searching for evidence
of criminal wrongdoing. 335 The inventory or recording of items taken is
done to protect the individual’s property from theft and to protect the police
against false claims of lost or stolen property. 336 The Court has made clear
that under this exception, police may search containers found on an
individual’s person 337 or in a motor vehicle 338 as long as the search is
conducted in accordance with standardized inventory procedures.
In Colorado v. Bertine, the Court rejected an argument that the
Container Doctrine applied to invalidate the warrantless search of a
backpack found in a van during an inventory of the van. 339 The Court
distinguished this case from Chadwick and Sanders on the ground that in
those cases, the search was solely for the purpose of investigating criminal

334
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374–75 (1987). In Florida v. Wells, the Court
noted that while the requirement of standardized criteria is intended to limit the discretion of
the inventorying officer, it is not intended to strip police officers of all discretion. 495 U.S.
1, 4 (1990) (invalidating search of locked suitcase found in trunk of car during inventory
search where highway patrol had no policy with regard to whether closed containers
encountered during an inventory search could be opened). In the Court’s view, a police
officer may be given discretion “to determine whether a container should or should not be
opened in light of the nature of the search and characteristics of the container itself.” Id.
“Thus, while policies of opening all containers or of opening no containers are
unquestionably permissible, it would be equally permissible, for example, to allow the
opening of closed containers whose contents officers determine they are unable to ascertain
from examining the containers’ exteriors.” Id. at 607.
335
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372. But see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (holding
subjective motivations of police officer irrelevant to lawfulness of inventory search).
336
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371–72.
337
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (shoulder bag defendant was carrying).
338
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 739 (backpack in defendant’s van).
339
Id.

2010]

THE DISAPPEARING CONTAINER DOCTRINE

1463

activity while in this case, the officer was just inventorying the contents of
the van he was impounding. 340
G. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES

Warrantless container searches are also permitted under what is called
the exigent circumstances exception. This exception to the warrant
requirement is somewhat of a catch-all, permitting police to conduct
warrantless searches whenever an emergency situation exists. The precise
requirements of the exigent circumstances exception are not hard and fast,
but generally, the police must be dealing with an emergency situation that
makes obtaining a warrant impracticable and the officer conducting the
search must have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be
found in the place searched. 341 Additionally, the emergency that justifies
the police action limits the appropriate scope of the search.342 Thus, if
police reasonably believe that stolen shotguns are being stored in a shed and
about to be moved, they may only search places or containers within the
shed that might contain a shotgun.
Even when it established the Container Doctrine, the Court recognized
that a warrant would not be required if police were dealing with an
emergency situation in which lives would be lost, individuals harmed, or
evidence destroyed if they took the time required to obtain a warrant before
conducting the search. 343 Lower courts have authorized warrantless
searches of containers under the exigent circumstances exception when
police reasonably believed the container at issue contained explosives.344
Additionally, under what is known as the emergency aid doctrine, 345 courts

340

Id.
1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
179–80 (5th ed. 2010).
342
Id. at 179.
343
See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (“In our view, when no
exigency is shown to support the need for an immediate search, the Warrant Clause places
the line at the point where the property to be searched comes under the exclusive dominion
of police authority.”).
344
United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1229 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding warrantless
search of suitcase in trunk permissible under the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement because officer had probable cause to believe suitcase could contain
explosives).
345
Under the emergency aid doctrine, which is different from the exigent circumstances
exception, police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively
reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened
with such injury. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
341
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have permitted warrantless searches of containers when the search was
reasonably believed necessary to assist an unconscious or injured person.346
H. REOPENING A CONTAINER AFTER A PRIOR LAWFUL OPENING

In 1983, the Court eroded the Container Doctrine even further when it
held that a search of a container after a prior lawful opening and controlled
delivery does not require a warrant.347 A controlled delivery typically
occurs
when a carrier, usually an airline, unexpectedly discovers what seems to be
contraband while inspecting luggage to learn the identity of its owner, or when the
contraband falls out of a broken or damaged piece of luggage, or when the carrier
exercises its inspection privilege because some suspicious circumstance has caused it
concern that it may unwittingly be transporting contraband. 348

After such a discovery, law enforcement agents frequently “restore the
contraband to its container, then close or reseal the container, and authorize
the carrier to deliver it to its owner.” 349 When the owner takes delivery, he
is arrested. 350 In Illinois v. Andreas, the Court held that there is no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of a sealed container
previously opened under lawful authority and that a warrant is not required
to re-open the container absent a substantial likelihood that the contents
have been changed. 351
V. FROM WARRANT PREFERENCE TO REASONABLENESS WITH TEETH
The gradual erosion of the Container Doctrine and the Court’s
corresponding shift from warrants to reasonableness is problematic for
many reasons. The shift reflects the Court’s preference for ex post
reasonableness review over ex ante judicial review through the warrant
process. Ex post reasonableness review is not necessarily bad, but is highly
deferential as currently applied, operating as a rubber stamp of approval in
favor of the challenged governmental action.352 Additionally, because the

346

United States v. Black, 860 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that a warrantless
search of unconscious individual’s purse for identification or medication was reasonable
given the emergency situation at hand); United States v. Dunavan, 485 F.2d 201 (6th Cir.
1973) (holding that a warrantless search of locked briefcase for identification of individual
found unconscious and foaming at the mouth was permissible to deal with the emergency).
347
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 773 (1983).
348
Id. at 770.
349
Id.
350
Id.
351
Id. at 773.
352
See Colb, supra note 38, at 1687–88 (noting that in cases where the Court applies
reasonableness balancing, it applies a “relaxed and deferential approach to the balancing at
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Court has failed to define reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment context,
reasonableness remains a vague and amorphous standard that provides little
guidance to police officers, attorneys, and lower courts.
Less obviously, the erosion of the Container Doctrine
disproportionately harms poor people, and by implication poor people of
As William Stuntz has observed, by protecting privacy
color. 353
expectations, the Fourth Amendment protects those with more privacy to
begin with, which generally means wealthier individuals who can afford to
live in nice homes. 354 For various reasons, the poor are more likely than the
wealthy to be found outside the home and on the street where they and their
portable containers are more susceptible to being searched without a
warrant. 355
Allowing police officers to search containers without a warrant also
undermines the concerns that originally motivated the Court to establish the
Container Doctrine: protecting the heightened expectations of privacy that
attend to the contents of portable containers and ensuring that the probable
cause determination is made by a neutral and detached judicial officer,
rather than a police officer. Given the numerous exceptions to the warrant
requirement that enable police officers to search containers without a
warrant, portable containers no longer enjoy their previous privileged status
at the top of the spectrum of Fourth Amendment protection. 356
In requiring police officers to obtain a warrant prior to searching a
container, the Court situated itself squarely on the side of warrants when it
established the Container Doctrine. While the Container Doctrine’s warrant
requirement seems at odds with the reasonableness view of the Fourth
Amendment, it may be possible to accommodate both the concerns that
hand”); Maclin, supra note 16, at 199 (arguing that Fourth Amendment questions tend to be
resolved using a test that approximates the deferential rational basis test).
353
See infra text accompanying notes 335–356.
354
William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1265, 1266–67 (1999).
355
See supra Part IV.A.2. for a discussion of how the erosion of the Container Doctrine
disproportionately hurts the poor.
356
While some of these exceptions, such as the search incident to arrest and consent
doctrines, also apply in the home, many of the exceptions that enable police to search
containers without a warrant do not apply to containers in homes. For example, the
automobile exception and the Terry stop and frisk doctrine do not apply to searches in the
home. Terry searches and auto searches typically occur on the street. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 4 (1968) (“This case presents serious questions concerning the role of the Fourth
Amendment in the confrontation on the street between the citizen and the policeman
investigating suspicious circumstances.”); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 403 (1985)
(“The automobile exception has been developed to ameliorate the practical problems
associated with the search of vehicles that have been stopped on the streets or public
highways because there was probable cause to believe they were transporting contraband.”).
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originally animated the Container Doctrine and the Court’s current
preference for an open-ended reasonableness standard over a more precise
warrant requirement. I suggest below that the Court may be able to
accommodate these two seemingly divergent interests by embracing a more
rigorous type of reasonableness review, which I call reasonableness with
teeth. To support my proposal, I look outside the criminal procedure arena
and borrow from a small slice of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.
Drawing lessons from several equal protection cases in which the Supreme
Court utilized a less deferential than usual rational basis review—what
some have called “rational basis with bite”—to strike down legislation
which discriminated against a politically unpopular group, I propose that
courts similarly engage in more rigorous review—reasonableness with teeth
—when deciding the constitutionality of warrantless container searches.
Before explaining the concept of reasonableness with teeth, I explain why
the erosion of the Container Doctrine should be of concern to anyone
interested in maintaining a robust Fourth Amendment.
A. WHY THE EROSION OF THE CONTAINER DOCTRINE IS
PROBLEMATIC

1. Problems with Normal Reasonableness Review
As explained in Part III, the erosion of the Container Doctrine has
largely tracked the Court’s movement away from warrants and its embrace
of reasonableness as the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Instead of insisting that police officers obtain a warrant before engaging in a
search unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies, the Court
allows police officers to search first, subject to later judicial review for
reasonableness.
When courts engage in reasonableness review, they tend to balance the
individual’s interests in privacy and dignity against the government’s
interests. 357 The ultimate inquiry is whether the search was reasonable
given all the circumstances. Reasonableness review offers the advantage of
flexibility and attention to context. Because reasonableness is an openended concept, courts utilizing reasonableness review may, in theory, take
into account any and all circumstances that might be relevant. In practice,
however, courts engaging in reasonableness review tend to focus primarily
357

Balancing tests are not without their critics. Alexander Aleinikoff identifies serious
problems with balancing tests in general. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the
Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987). Wayne Holly critiques the Court’s
reasonableness balancing methodology for “fail[ing] to account for the difference between a
‘right’ guaranteed by the Constitution and an individual or government’s mere ‘interest’ in
achieving a particular goal.” Holly, supra note 21, at 556–57.
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on two factors: the government’s interest in conducting the search and the
individual’s interest in privacy. At a time when Americans seem
increasingly willing to trade privacy for convenience (think of the amount
of personal information people are willing to put on Facebook), 358
balancing these two interests is likely to result in more intrusive
governmental activity given decreasing expectations of privacy.
a. The Traditional Critique of Reasonableness
While balancing with an eye to reasonableness appears to be a fair way
to determine whether someone’s Fourth Amendment rights have been
violated, it is not fair when the Supreme Court balances with its thumb on
the scale in favor of the government. 359 Rather than being neutral, Fourth
Amendment reasonableness review tends to be highly deferential to the
government. So deferential that Tracey Maclin and other legal scholars
often compare Fourth Amendment reasonableness review to rational basis
review in the equal protection context. 360 Just as courts engaging in equal
protection rational basis review will invalidate social and economic
legislation only if there is absolutely no rational explanation, real or
imagined, for the legislation, courts engaging in Fourth Amendment
reasonableness review will invalidate a search or seizure “only when the
police act irrationally.” 361 If the reviewing court “can identify any plausible
goal or reason that promotes law enforcement interests,”362 the challenged
358
See Dan Fletcher, Friends Without Borders, TIME, May 31, 2010, at 32, 32–35
(noting that 500 million people subscribe to Facebook and that with 48 billion unique
images, Facebook houses the world’s largest photo collection); see also Monica Hesse,
Status Symbol: Look at Facebook Now, WASH. POST, July 23, 2010, at A1 (arguing that
either Facebook has ruined our concept of privacy or privacy is an outdated construct).
359
See Davies, note 145, at 3–6 (arguing that two factors account for the Rehnquist
Court’s tendency to defer to the government in Fourth Amendment cases: (1) the
composition of the Court, and (2) the fact that the Justices refuse to be bound by
constitutional doctrine and principles). The Court itself has acknowledged that in cases
where it finds probable cause, it does not actually balance but almost always finds in favor of
the government. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817–18 (1996) (noting that
while in principle, every Fourth Amendment case involves a balancing of all relevant factors
to determine reasonableness, in practice, where probable cause is found, the only cases
where the Court actually balances is when searches or seizures are conducted in an
extraordinary manner).
360
Maclin, supra note 16, at 199 (“Fourth Amendment questions are resolved using a
test that approximates the rational basis standard, which is the test used to decide equal
protection and due process challenges to social and economic legislation.”); see also Stuntz,
supra note 309, at 554 (“The Supreme Court’s generalized ‘reasonableness’ standard
resembles not negligence, but rational basis constitutional review: when the standard applies,
the government wins, save perhaps for a few egregious cases.”).
361
Maclin, supra note 16, at 200.
362
Id.
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police conduct will be considered reasonable and not in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. While it may make sense to defer to the government
when the court is reviewing social and economic legislation that does not
impact a suspect class or fundamental right, reasonableness review in the
Fourth Amendment context should not be deferential given the concerns
about government overreaching that animated our founding fathers to
include the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights.363 The judiciary
should not abdicate its responsibility of checking the executive when a
fundamental right is at issue.
A second problem with reasonableness review is the lack of guidance
that the Court has provided to lower courts deciding the validity of searches
under a generalized reasonableness standard. Instead of a bright-line rule,
the reasonableness approach allows reviewing courts to decide whether a
search was lawful without any benchmarks to guide them in this difficult
decision. This lack of guidance is particularly striking given that the Court
has on numerous occasions spoken of the importance of having bright-line
rules in the Fourth Amendment context to guide police officers who often
need to make quick, on-the-spot decisions in the field. 364 In the hustle and
bustle of daily trial practice, trial courts also have to make quick decisions.
An abstract reasonableness standard provides little guidance to help them
make such decisions. 365
b. The Critique of Reasonableness from the Left
Beyond the traditional critique of reasonableness, both feminist theory
and critical race theory offer additional insights. First, in purporting to be
neutral and objective, a reasonableness standard can mask the fact that what
the law considers reasonable is often just what those in positions of
authority consider to be reasonable. 366 As Dana Raigrodski notes,
“[R]easonableness and common sense have always been assigned a race
(white), a gender (male), and a class (wealthy).” 367

363

Id. at 201 (arguing that the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of
police power and discretion).
364
See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991); New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 458 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). For a critique of
the Court’s embrace of bright line rules in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see
Alschuler, supra note 37.
365
I thank Jenny Roberts for this observation.
366
Dana Raigrodski, Reasonableness and Objectivity: A Feminist Discourse of the
Fourth Amendment, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 153 (2008).
367
Id. at 187. For an excellent analysis of the Wardlow Court’s failure to acknowledge
the race, gender, and class implications of the case, see id. at 185–88.
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Moreover, most reasonableness standards assume “some transcendent,
universal knowledge, independent from and uninfluenced by the
observer.” 368 But as feminist scholars and race crits have long argued,
gender, race, sexual orientation, and class, among other things, can
influence not only the way one experiences life, but also the way one
perceives the world. 369
In a piercingly thoughtful analysis of the Florida v. Bostick
decision, 370 Devon Carbado explains how Justice O’Connor’s color-blind
ideology allowed her to ignore the influence that race could have had on the
question whether the defendant was “seized” by police. 371 The test for a
seizure of the person at that time was whether a reasonable person in the
defendant’s shoes would have felt free to leave. 372
In Florida v. Bostick, two uniformed police officers boarded a bus
bound from Miami to Atlanta.373 Without any particularized reason to think
that Terrance Bostick, a young African-American male, was carrying drugs,
the officers asked Bostick to show identification and consent to a search of

368
Id. at 185; see also Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The
Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1210–15 (1990)
(providing an insightful critique of the “Reasonable Man” standard used in tort law).
369
See John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing
an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2144
(1992) (noting that because the worlds of blacks and whites have been intensely separate
since slavery, it is “no surprise that blacks and whites so often see quite different realities at
both the perceptual and experiential levels”); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar:
Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 572 (1984) (“The
uniformity of life experience of the inner circle of writers [a handful of white, male law
professors] may color not only the way they conceptualize and frame problems of race, but
also the solutions or remedies they devise.”); Camille A. Nelson, Lyrical Assault: Dancehall
versus the Cultural Imperialism of the North-West, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 231, 263
(2008) (arguing that sexual orientation, gender, class and race can influence whether and
how one perceives threats to one’s person); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of
Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1138, 1141 (2007) (noting that “race deeply affects the
perceptions, experiences, consciousness, and opportunities of all Blacks, regardless of their
ancestry and class status,” while arguing that ancestral heritage, including whether a Black
student descended from slaves in the United States, should also play a role in the
implementation of affirmative action policies); Raigrodski, supra note 366, at 185; see also
Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 723, 723–24 (1992) (“Life experiences and personal perspective often
influence how one envisions the substance and function of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights.”).
370
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
371
Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946
(2002).
372
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
373
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431.
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his luggage. 374 Bostick claimed he did not consent to a search of his
luggage, but the officers thought Bostick consented, so they opened his
suitcase and found cocaine within.375 Bostick was arrested and charged
with trafficking in cocaine. 376 Before trial, Bostick moved to suppress the
cocaine found in his suitcase, arguing that it was seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 377
While Justice O’Connor, who wrote the majority opinion, does not
decide whether Bostick was seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, she suggests that the encounter between Bostick and the
officers on the bus was consensual and that a reasonable person in Bostick’s
shoes would have felt free to leave.378 Justice O’Connor is able to draw the
conclusion that a reasonable person in Bostick’s shoes would have felt free
to leave or terminate the encounter with the officer only by ignoring
Bostick’s race. As Carbado explains:
Nowhere in Justice O’Connor’s opinion does she entertain the possibility that Bostick
may have been targeted because he is black. In fact, Justice O’Connor does not even
mention Bostick’s race. Nor does she mention the race of the officers. In this sense,
an argument can be made that Justice O’Connor’s analysis ignores race. This
argument, however, is only partially correct. That is, while it is fair to say that Justice
O’Connor’s analysis ignores the fact that Bostick is black and the officers are white, it
is more accurate to say that her analysis constructs Bostick and the officers with the
racial ideology of colorblindness. In other words, the problem is not that Justice
O’Connor does not see race, but rather that she sees race in a particular way. Her
decision to see Bostick as a man and not as a black man does not ignore race; it
constructs race. 379

Carbado explains why Justice O’Connor’s failure to acknowledge race
in this case is relevant:
The interaction of black male identity with white male police authority creates a
physically confining social situation every bit as real as (and operating independently
from) being on a bus. Most, if not all, black people—especially black men—are
apprehensive about police encounters. They grow up with racial stories of police

374

Id.
Id. at 431–32 (“[T]here is a conflict in the evidence about whether the defendant
consented to the search.”).
376
Id. at 432.
377
Id.
378
Id. at 437 (“The facts of this case . . . leave some doubt whether a seizure occurred
. . . . Nevertheless, we refrain from deciding whether or not a seizure occurred in this
case.”). The test for a seizure of the person is whether the reasonable person in the
defendant’s shoes would have felt free to leave or terminate the encounter with the police.
See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (establishing the “free to leave” test
for seizures of the person); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 429 (modifying test for a seizure when the
reason the individual might not feel free to leave is not due to coercive actions of the police).
379
Carbado, supra note 371, at 977–78.
375
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abuse—witnessing them as public spectacles in the media, observing them firsthand in
their communities, and experiencing them as daily realities. Put another way, racebased policing is part of black people’s collective consciousness. Thus, when black
people encounter the police, “[t]hey don’t know whether justice will be meted out or
whether judge, jury and executioner is pulling up behind them.” Yet, Justice
O’Connor situates her seizure analysis outside of this racial reality. She removes
Bostick and the police officers from a social context in which race is material to a
discursive, socially constructed world in which it is not. At no time does Justice
O’Connor consider how Bostick, or a man in his racial position, might have
experienced two white police officers crowded around him on a bus. She race
neutralizes the encounter. Bostick’s race, the race of the officers, and the relationship
between the two receive no textual engagement in her analysis. Thus, her opinion
fails to consider that Bostick may have been the target of a particular racial
preference. 380

Similarly, Anthony Thompson provides a racial critique of the Terry v.
Ohio decision, which held that a stop and frisk of two black men and their
white companion was reasonable. 381 Thompson points out that Chief
Justice Warren, writing the majority opinion in Terry, recounted the facts of
the case in entirely race-neutral terms, never revealing that Terry and one of
his companions were black and that Terry’s other companion and Detective
McFadden were white.382 Thompson points out that only when one
considers race does Detective McFadden’s assertion—that he couldn’t say
precisely what drew his attention to the defendants and that he just didn’t
like them—make sense. 383
The problematic nature of open-ended reasonableness standards has
led many feminist scholars to argue in favor of more subjective standards
over purportedly objective ones. 384 In the self-defense context, for
380

Id. at 985 (internal quotation deleted).
Thompson, supra note 256, at 969 (arguing that the Court created a “police officer as
expert” narrative to justify the stop and frisk); see also Robin K. Magee, The Myth of the
Good Cop and the Inadequacy of Fourth Amendment Remedies for Black Men: Contrasting
Presumptions of Innocence and Guilt, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 151, 214–15 (1994) (critiquing the
presumption that police officers usually act from good motives).
382
Thompson, supra note 256, at 964.
383
Id. at 966 (“When one adds the missing racial element to the Court’s statement of
facts, certain otherwise inexplicable events suddenly become much more comprehensible.
Detective McFadden’s assertion that ‘he was unable to say precisely what first drew his eye
to [Terry and Chilton],’ an assertion accepted by the trial court and uncritically recited by the
Supreme Court, assumes a new meaning when one views Terry as a case in which a white
detective noticed—and then focused his attention on—two black men who were doing
nothing more than standing on a street corner in downtown Cleveland in the middle of the
afternoon.”).
384
See, e.g., CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE
REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN (2000); see also Dolores A. Donovan &
Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on SelfDefense and Provocation, 14 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 435 (1981). But see Naomi R. Cahn, The
381
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example, some feminist scholars have argued that battered women who kill
their abusers in non-confrontational situations should not be held to the
usual reasonable person standard, but instead should be compared to the
average battered woman. 385 In response to the feminist critique of
reasonableness, some courts have openly embraced a reasonable woman
standard in cases involving female defendants claiming self-defense. 386
Some courts have embraced a reasonable woman standard in the sexual
harassment arena as well. 387 In the Fourth Amendment context, Dana
Raigrodski urges the Court to abandon reasonableness standards altogether
and instead embrace the values of anti-subordination and empowerment. 388
While I agree with the concerns raised by my fellow feminist and
critical race colleagues, I do not see the Court jettisoning reasonableness as
the cornerstone of its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence anytime soon.
Moreover, even if it wanted to, the Court could not abandon reasonableness
as a requirement for a valid search or seizure. The text of the Fourth
Amendment includes an explicit command that searches and seizures not be
unreasonable. 389 Given these considerations, my proposal for reform works
Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992) (illustrating problems with a reasonable woman standard).
385
See, e.g., Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women’s Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L.
REV. 393, 415 (1988) (“Given that courts consider at least some of the particular defendant’s
attributes and circumstances in defining the ‘reasonable person,’ they should likewise
present an instruction that directs the jury to measure the defendant’s actions against those of
the ‘reasonable battered woman.’”); see also Marina Angel, Why Judy Norman Acted in
Reasonable Self-Defense: An Abused Woman and a Sleeping Man, 16 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J.
65, 77 (2008) (arguing that the reasonable person standard should be defined so as to “adopt
all of the characteristics of the individual on trial”). But see Holly Maguigan, Battered
Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 379, 444–45 (1991) (rejecting adoption of a reasonable battered woman
standard); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist
Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 566 (1992) (“There
is no single ‘reasonable woman,’ and I worry about the ways that adoption of a separate
standard for battered women in particular or women in general will penalize women’s
different experiences and women’s departures from a stereotypical norm.”).
386
See, e.g., State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (reversing female defendant’s
murder conviction in part because jury was instructed to measure her beliefs and actions
against that of a reasonable man in the same circumstances when they should have taken into
account her gender in deciding her claim of self-defense). Some courts have held that in
cases involving battered women claiming self-defense, evidence of battered woman
syndrome is relevant to the reasonableness determination. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763
P.2d 572, 646 (Kan. 1988) (“In cases involving battered spouses, expert evidence of the
battered woman syndrome is relevant to a determination of the reasonableness of the
defendant’s perception of danger.”).
387
See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
388
Raigrodski, supra note 366, at 214–15.
389
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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within the reasonableness framework that the Court has openly embraced.
Even though reasonableness review to date has tended to result in rulings
favoring the government, there is no reason why reasonableness review has
to be deferential, pro-government, or anti-progressive.
2. How the Erosion of the Container Doctrine Harms the Homeless and the
Urban Poor
One underappreciated ramification of the erosion of the Container
Doctrine is its impact on the homeless and the urban poor, and its
corresponding impact on poor people of color living in the inner city. 390 As
Lenese Herbert notes, “[T]he police in high-crime neighborhoods often
violate the [Fourth Amendment’s] strictures and regularly reach inside (and
often empty) pockets, bags, hats, purses, and other effects without having
sufficient suspicion that the stopped individuals are armed.” 391
The confluence of several factors contributes to this state of affairs.
First, police do most of their policing in poor, high crime neighborhoods. 392
Second, the homeless and the urban poor spend more time outside their
homes and on the street where they are more vulnerable to being stopped
and searched. 393
Because police tend to focus their crime-fighting activities in poor
urban neighborhoods, 394 one is more likely to be stopped and searched if
one lives in a low income, high crime neighborhood than if one lives in a
more affluent area. If the search uncovers incriminating evidence, that
search is likely to be upheld as lawful. This is because lower courts
deciding whether police had the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop and
frisk an individual tend to give enormous weight to the location where the

390

Here, I borrow from William Stuntz’s definition of the “poor.” Stuntz explains, “[B]y
‘poor’ or ‘lower-class’ or ‘downscale’ communities, I mean communities in which
unemployment is high, legally acquired wealth and income are low, and educational and
social resources are below par.” William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1795, 1801 (1998).
391
Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See What I’m Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a
Crime in High-Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 135, 137 (2002).
392
Cynthia Hujar Orr, Meet Marcel Johnson, CHAMPION, Apr. 2010, at 14 (“It is a reality
that the police more heavily patrol poor urban neighborhoods where the majority of the
population is Latino or Black.”).
393
See infra text accompanying notes 403–410.
394
See Orr, supra note 392, at 14 (noting that police more heavily patrol poor urban
neighborhoods); see also Russell L. Weaver, Fourth Amendment Federalism and the
Silencing of the American Poor, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 277, 282 (2010) (noting that police
are more likely to conduct surveillance in poor urban neighborhoods populated by racial
minorities).
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stop took place. 395 If the stop takes place in a “high crime” or “high drug
activity” area, little else is necessary for the court to find the requisite
reasonable suspicion. 396
Many poor people of color live in high crime neighborhoods. This
does not mean that poor racial minorities are more likely than others to
engage in criminal activity. As I. Bennett Capers observes, “Crime tends to
be high in minority neighborhoods not because of the presence of
minorities, but largely because the neighborhoods themselves tend to be
criminogenic due to disproportionate lack of educational opportunities,
jobs, services, and concern.” 397 Many poor people of color live in high
crime neighborhoods because they cannot afford to live in better
neighborhoods. Unfortunately, location often serves as “a proxy for race or
ethnicity.” 398 As Lewis Katz notes, “By sanctioning investigative stops on
little more than the area in which the stop takes place, the phrase ‘high
crime area’ has the effect of criminalizing race.” 399
One study found that stops and frisks by New York City police
officers were disproportionately concentrated in the city’s poorest
neighborhoods, which also happened to be the neighborhoods with the
highest concentrations of racial minorities.400 The study also found that
poor persons of color were more likely than white individuals to be stopped,
questioned, searched and arrested by police.401 David Harris explains why
blacks and Latinos living in poor, high crime neighborhoods tend to receive
disproportionate police scrutiny:
In many courts an individual’s presence in a high crime location plus evasion of the
police equals suspicion reasonable enough to allow a stop under Terry. African
Americans, Hispanic Americans, and poor people are likely to find themselves in such
high crime areas, simply because they live and work there. If these people choose to
avoid the police—a choice they have the constitutional right to make—the police may
stop them. If the location is not just a high crime area but a location known for drug
activity, the police may go further: They may search the individual, performing a
Terry pat-down. In other words, every person who works or lives in a high crime area
395

Katz, supra note 256, at 493 (“Consequently, lower courts give enormous weight to
this collateral factor, often requiring little more than some other innocuous bits of
information to fulfill the reasonable suspicion requirement justifying a stop. Thus, ‘high
crime area’ becomes a centerpiece of the Terry analysis, serving almost as a talismanic
signal justifying investigative stops.”).
396
Id.
397
I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 49
(2009).
398
Katz, supra note 256, at 493.
399
Id.
400
Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and
Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 477 (2007).
401
Id. at 458.
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and who avoids the police is subject to automatic seizure, and to automatic search if
the crime suspected involves drugs. Due to the disproportionately high number of
African Americans and Hispanic Americans living in those areas, they are subject to
this treatment much more often than are whites. 402

A second reason why the erosion of the Container Doctrine
disproportionately affects the urban poor and the homeless has to do with
the Court’s focus on protecting reasonable expectations of privacy as the
primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment. With privacy at the core of
Fourth Amendment protections, one’s activities in the privacy of one’s
home will be more protected than one’s activities on the street. As William
Stuntz observes, by focusing on privacy as the primary interest protected by
the Fourth Amendment, the Court favors those who already have more
privacy to begin with. 403 Those with more money can usually afford to live
in detached single family dwellings in the suburbs with lots of space
between their home and the next-door neighbor’s home. 404 Those with less
money often live in crowded, multi-tenant apartment buildings or public
housing. 405
Despite the usual rule that police need a warrant in order to search a
home, police can search a home shared by multiple tenants without a
warrant if one of the co-tenants consents to the search. Under the Court’s
third-party consent jurisprudence, not only can police search a home
without a warrant upon receiving consent of a third party with actual

402

Harris, supra note 296, at 680–81.
Stuntz, supra note 354, at 1266–67.
404
Id. at 1270 (“People with more money are more likely to live in detached houses with
yards; people with less money are more likely to live in apartment buildings with common
hallways.”); see also SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND
ECONOMY OF THE URBAN POOR 89 (2006) (noting that “[i]n suburban and middle- and upperincome communities, the boundaries between the home and the outside world can be
maintained intact,” whereas in poor urban neighborhoods, “private space is at a premium, if
not a luxury”). That wealthy people tend to live in detached houses may not be the case in
all cities. For example, many affluent individuals in Washington, D.C. choose to live in
Georgetown, Capitol Hill, or Dupont Circle where million dollar homes are often rowhouses
which share adjoining walls. However, wealthy people rarely live in crowded multi-tenant
apartment buildings.
405
Stuntz, supra note 354, at 1270. Carrie Leonetti observes that lower courts tend to
treat the common areas of an apartment building, including the hallways, as open fields,
which means police can enter these areas without a warrant or any justification. Carrie
Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: Application of the Curtilage Doctrine to Urban and
Suburban Areas, 15 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 297 (2005) (arguing that lower courts should
treat the hallway area just outside a tenant’s apartment as curtilage, not open fields). Police
sometimes engage in warrantless, suspicionless searches of residents of public housing. See
Adam Carlis, The Illegality of Vertical Patrols, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 2002, 2002 (2009)
(“[R]ecent years have brought systematic, suspicionless searches of [public housing]
residents’ homes.”).
403
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authority, i.e., mutual use of the property or joint access or control,406 but
police can also search the home without a warrant even if it turns out the
person does not in fact have the requisite actual authority. 407 As long as a
reviewing court finds that the officer’s belief was reasonable, the consent
will be deemed valid.408
The Fourth Amendment provides even less protection for the homes of
the homeless. Lower courts routinely hold that homeless persons lack a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes when that home is a
cardboard box or some other fixture on public property, either because the
homeless person cannot claim an ownership interest in the property or
because his home is open to public view. 409
If one has a nice home, one is likely to spend time relaxing or
entertaining within one’s home. If one lives in a crowded, noisy, multitenant apartment building, or in a place with little privacy like a shelter, one
is more likely to spend time relaxing or visiting friends outside the home. 410
Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh studied the lives of the urban poor and found that
406
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (“The authority which
justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property . . . but rests rather on
mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most
purposes . . . .”).
407
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
408
Id.
409
See, e.g., United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1472–73 (10th Cir. 1986)
(finding that homeless man did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in cave on
government land where he lived); State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 152 (Conn. 1991)
(finding that homeless person lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in area under
public bridge where he slept and kept his personal belongings); People v. Thomas, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 610, 613 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding that homeless person residing in cardboard box
on public sidewalk in violation of city ordinance lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his home); State v. Cleator, 857 P. 2d 306, 309 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (finding no
reasonable expectation of privacy in tent unlawfully erected on public property); see also
David H. Steinberg, Constructing Homes for the Homeless? Searching for a Fourth
Amendment Standard, 41 DUKE L.J. 1508, 1538 (1992) (supporting the holding in Mooney
on the ground that Mooney, who lacked any positive entitlement to the land on which he
lived, had no reasonable expectation of privacy in that land). But see United States v.
Sandoval, 200 F.3d 659, 660–61 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy
in tent erected on government property). Little has been written on whether the Fourth
Amendment applies to protect the belongings of individuals in homeless shelters against
warrantless searches. See Steven R. Morrison, The Fourth Amendment’s Applicability to
Residents of Homeless Shelters, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 319, 321 (2009) (“[O]nly a handful of
opinions have dealt with the Fourth Amendment’s applicability [to] homeless shelters.”).
410
Stuntz, supra note 354, at 1272 (“It is poor people in cities who tend to live in large
apartment buildings, to travel by bus or subway, and because of a combination of income
and concentrated population, to spend more time on the street than do people in other
places.”); see also VENKATESH, supra note 404, at 172 (“People are pushed outside by
overcrowding, families’ ‘doubling up’ to pay rent, and the generally inhospitable condition
of apartments.”).
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“[w]hat some might see as a mass of Americans lying about, and out of
work, is in many cases an ensemble of persons who lack private places
where they can rest.” 411 William Stuntz observes that it is common to see
people in poor urban neighborhoods hanging out on the street at all hours of
the night and day because sitting on one’s front stoop or wandering the
streets and talking to neighbors is less costly than other forms of
entertainment.412
Encounters between the police and individuals on the street are much
more common than searches within the home that generally require a
warrant. 413 On the street, police do not need a warrant to stop and question
individuals or engage in a host of investigative activity that can culminate
in the search of a portable container.414 For example, on the street, an
officer can walk up to an individual and question him for any reason or no
reason at all as long as a reasonable person in the individual’s shoes would
feel free to leave. 415 Of course, the average person would not feel free to
leave if an officer stopped him or her and started asking questions. 416
Nonetheless, in numerous cases the Court has declined to find that a seizure
of the person occurred under facts strongly suggesting that the average
person in the defendant’s shoes would not have felt free to leave. 417
411
VENKATESH, supra note 404, at 172; see also SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, GANG
LEADER FOR A DAY: A ROGUE SOCIOLOGIST TAKES TO THE STREETS (2008) (describing the
life of a gang leader and other individuals living in a public housing project in Chicago).
412
Stuntz, supra note 354, at 1271.
413
William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 1016, 1062 (1995) (“[T]here are many, many more street encounters than searches
of homes.”).
414
Stuntz, supra note 354, at 1271 (“Fourth Amendment law makes it easy for police to
stop and search pedestrians.”).
415
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 209 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“A
perfect example of police conduct that supports no colorable claim of seizure is the act of an
officer who simply goes up to a pedestrian on the street and asks him a question.”); Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (“[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by
asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the
person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence . . . his voluntary answers to such
questions.”).
416
In the first empirical study of its kind, David Kessler surveyed 406 randomly selected
Boston residents and found that most would not feel free to terminate an encounter with
police, even with knowledge of the right to leave. David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An
Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment’s Seizure Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 51, 74–78 (2009). Kessler also found that women and young people under
the age of twenty-five would feel even less free to leave than men and adults over the age of
twenty-five. Id. at 75.
417
See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197–99, 203 (finding no seizure of bus passengers
where three plainclothes officers with visible badges and concealed weapons boarded bus
and one officer knelt on driver’s seat and faced the rear while the other two officers walked
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On the street, an officer with very little justification—the Court calls it
reasonable suspicion—can briefly detain an individual and perform a patdown frisk of the person’s outer clothing in a search for weapons. 418 As
noted in Part III, even though the officer is supposed to have a reason to
suspect the individual is armed and dangerous prior to conducting the frisk,
courts often assume that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity gives rise
to a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.419 If the
officer comes across a container on the suspect during the frisk, he may
open that container without a warrant and it is likely that a court will uphold
his warrantless search. 420
On the street, a police officer does not need a warrant to arrest an
individual as long as the officer has probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the arrestee committed it. 421 Once the officer
arrests the individual, he can conduct a full search of the arrestee’s
person. 422 Incident to arrest, he can search any containers on the arrestee’s
person 423 or within the arrestee’s wingspan. 424
In the workplace, the focus on reasonable expectations of privacy
means the Fourth Amendment protects the interests of white-collar workers
more than blue-collar workers. If police want to search an enclosed private
office, ordinarily they must obtain a search warrant based on probable
cause. 425 People who work in factories, on assembly lines, on shop floors,
to the rear of the bus and began asking passengers questions); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210
(1984) (finding no seizure of factory workers where INS agents moved through factory to
question workers regarding their immigration status while other INS agents stood near the
exits); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (finding no seizure where
defendant was approached by DEA agents while walking through airport concourse, asked to
show identification and airline ticket, asked why the name on the ticket did not match the
name on the driver’s license, and asked to accompany the agents to the airport DEA office
for further questions after her driver’s license and airline ticket were returned to her).
418
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
419
See infra text accompanying notes 292–303.
420
See infra Part IV.D.2 and IV.D.3 (discussing Minnesota v. Dickerson and Illinois v.
Wardlow).
421
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
422
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
423
Id.
424
Id.; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
425
Stuntz, supra note 354, at 1270. If an individual works for the government, however,
his or her office might be searched without a warrant if a court finds that the governmental
interests outweigh the individual’s privacy interests. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,
719–20 (1987) (plurality opinion) (“In the case of searches conducted by a public employer,
we must balance the invasion of the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against
the government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the
workplace.”). Without deciding whether the search before it was reasonable, the O’Connor
Court held that “public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy
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or in hotel kitchens, however, usually do not have offices, so the police can
often enter and observe their workplaces without a warrant. 426
One might think that when it comes to cars, the Fourth Amendment
treats wealthy and poor drivers alike. Regardless of whether you are
wealthy or poor, a police officer can search your car without a warrant as
long as the officer has probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime
within the car. As Stuntz notes, “[O]ne can enjoy as much, or as little,
privacy in an old Chevrolet as in a new Lexus.”427 Even though all drivers,
in theory, are treated alike, in reality, black and Latino drivers are stopped
at rates greatly disproportionate to their numbers in the community, and
their cars are more often searched than the cars of white drivers.428
Moreover, the urban poor and middle class often use public transportation
instead of cars, 429 possibly because of the high cost of parking downtown.
The Fourth Amendment generally treats passengers on subways and buses
just like pedestrians on the street. 430
Since poor and homeless people tend to conduct most of their activity
on the street, they and the portable containers they carry are more likely to
be searched without a warrant than individuals and containers that stay
within the four walls of a home. Importantly, it is not just poor and
homeless criminals who are affected by the erosion of protection for
containers on the street. Poor and homeless individuals who lead lawabiding lives are also more likely to have their expectations of privacy
intruded upon than more wealthy individuals who spend less of their time
on the street.

interests of government employees for non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as
for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of
reasonableness under all the circumstances.” Id. at 725–26. In other words, a government
employer might not need a search warrant to search a government employee’s office.
426
Stuntz, supra note 354, at 1271.
427
Id.
428
DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK
79–80 (2002) (noting that during 1995 and 1996, blacks, who constituted only 17% of all
drivers, made up 70% of drivers who were stopped and searched by Maryland State Police
and that in 2000, black and Latino drivers constituted 78% of all drivers on the southern end
of the New Jersey turnpike who were stopped and searched by New Jersey State Police);
David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court
and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 560 (1997); see also
Capers, supra note 397, at 67 (noting that a recent study of police stops in two
predominantly white suburban communities found that African-American drivers had license
plate query rates that were 325% and 383% greater than those of the general driver
population).
429
Stuntz, supra note 354, at 1271.
430
Id.
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B. BORROWING FROM THE COURT’S EQUAL PROTECTION
JURISPRUDENCE

Under the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, if a law
burdens a fundamental right or targets a suspect class, such as race,
alienage, or national origin, the reviewing court must apply strict scrutiny
review, striking down the legislation unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.431 If legislation discriminates on the
basis of gender, the reviewing court will apply heightened or intermediate
scrutiny, striking down the legislation if it fails to substantially further an
important governmental purpose. 432 If a law does not burden a fundamental
right or target a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, the Court will
uphold the legislation as long as the classification bears “a rational relation
to some legitimate end.” 433
In most cases, the level of scrutiny employed effectively predetermines
whether the legislation will be struck down as constitutionally infirm or
upheld. If strict or intermediate scrutiny applies, the legislation will almost
always be struck down, leading Gerald Gunther to remark that strict
scrutiny review is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”434 On the other hand,
if rational basis review is the applicable standard, the challenged legislation
will almost always be upheld.435 When a court applies rational basis
431

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723–24 (1982) (noting that when a
statute classifies individuals on the basis of gender, the party seeking to uphold the statute
must show “that the classification serves ‘important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed’ are ‘substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives’”); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional
challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.”). A classification based on illegitimacy, which is considered a quasi-suspect
classification, is also subject to heightened review. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,
461 (1988) (noting that intermediate scrutiny has been applied to discriminatory
classifications based on illegitimacy); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98–99 (1982)
(noting that restrictions based on illegitimacy “will survive equal protection scrutiny to the
extent they are substantially related to a legitimate state interest”). But see Mass. Bd. of Ret.
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to classification
based on age).
433
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); see also City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440
(“The general rule is that [such] legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if
the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).
434
Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
435
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV.
297, 304 (1997) (“The rational basis test is extremely permissive, and in the case of
economic or social legislation has traditionally led to almost automatic approval.”); Robert
C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term
432
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review, it gives the legislature wide latitude because it is presumed that
even improvident or unwise social or economic legislation will eventually
be corrected through the democratic process. 436
In three rare cases, which Cass Sunstein calls the “Moreno-CleburneRomer Triology,” the Supreme Court struck down legislation that
discriminated against politically unpopular groups using rational basis
review that looked more like heightened scrutiny. 437 In Moreno, Cleburne,
and Romer, the Court did not do what it usually does when it applies
rational basis review. Instead of rubber-stamping the legislation in
question, the Court scrutinized the reasons provided by the State,
discredited the State’s purported motives, and struck down the legislation
on the ground that it was not supported by a legitimate governmental
interest. 438 As others have put it, the Court applied “rational basis with
bite.” 439
The Moreno-Cleburne-Romer trilogy involved legislation that harmed
a group the Court considered politically unpopular, but not suspect or quasisuspect. The legislation in Moreno, which barred individuals who lived in
households with at least one unrelated person from obtaining food stamps,
was aimed at preventing hippies from being eligible for food stamps. 440
The legislation in Cleburne made it harder for group homes for people with

Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 357 (1999) (noting that rationality review is
“ordinarily deferential and minimal”).
436
City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
437
Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59, 61 (1996).
Robert Farrell notes that the Court has struck down social and economic legislation using
rational basis with bite on several other occasions. Farrell, supra note 435, at 357 (claiming
that between 1971 and 1996, the Court decided ten successful rational basis claims while
rejecting rational basis arguments in one hundred cases).
438
See Sunstein, supra note 437, at 59–63.
439
See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 435, at 327 (noting that Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer
have been categorized as cases applying “rational basis review with bite”); Gunther, supra
note 434, at 18–19 (noting that in seven of the fifteen basic equal protection decisions in the
1971 term, “the Court upheld the [equal protection] claim or remanded it for consideration
without mentioning the ‘strict scrutiny’ formula,” thus finding “bite in the equal protection
cases after explicitly voicing the traditionally toothless minimal scrutiny standard”); see also
Gayle Lynne Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny By Any Other
Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s use of rational basis review
with bite and arguing that this type of review is just intermediate scrutiny in disguise);
Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court
Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on
Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769 (2005) (arguing that the Court’s failure to
articulate the factors triggering rational basis with bite review has led to confusion in the
lower courts).
440
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 530, 534–35 (1973).
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mental disabilities to meet certain zoning requirements.441 The legislation
in Romer treated gays and lesbians differently than heterosexuals by
prohibiting any legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect
gays and lesbians from discrimination.442 Underlying each of these cases
was the belief that the majoritarian democratic process would not correct
legislation that disadvantaged a politically unpopular group.
Not requiring police to get a warrant before searching a portable
container, the net effect of the erosion of the Container Doctrine, also
disproportionately harms two politically powerless groups—the homeless
and the urban poor. 443 Borrowing from the Court’s rational basis with bite
jurisprudence, I suggest that when the government claims that an exception
to the warrant requirement justifies a warrantless search of a container, in
addition to deciding whether the requirements of the exception have been
satisfied, the reviewing court should conduct a non-deferential inquiry into
the overall reasonableness of the search. In other words, just as the Court
has applied rational basis review with bite when social and economic

441

City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 436–37. For an insightful analysis of the Cleburne
decision, see Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally
Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV.
111, 113–40 (1987).
442
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
443
See Ann M. Burkhart, The Constitutional Underpinnings of Homelessness, 40 HOUS.
L. REV. 211, 273–75 (2003) (discussing the legal and practical obstacles that prevent or
discourage the poor and the homeless from voting). The erosion of the Container Doctrine
also harms another group—those caught with contraband or evidence of a crime in their
portable containers who become criminal defendants. Many scholars have argued that
criminal defendants are a politically unpopular or disfavored group. See generally Donald
A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why
Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1079 (1993) (arguing that legislatures undervalue the rights of the accused); Adam M.
Gershowitz, Imposing a Gap on Capital Punishment, 72 MO. L. REV. 73, 116–17 (2007)
(arguing that the unpopularity of criminal defendants make them the quintessential discrete
and insular minority); Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571,
594 (2005) (arguing that criminal defendants are an unpopular group); David A. Sklansky,
Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1290
(2002) (noting that criminal defendants as a group are “peculiarly powerless to protect
themselves through the normal processes of majoritarian democracy.”); William J. Stuntz,
Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 20–21
(1996) (arguing that criminal suspects as a group find it hard or impossible to protect
themselves through the political process). But see Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the
“American Criminal Class”: Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants,
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599 (2004) (arguing that the federalization of crime exposes politically
prominent individuals, including members of Congress, to the criminal justice system and
thus ensures that lawmakers will not be wholly antagonistic to criminal defendants).
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legislation harms a politically unpopular group, the Court should apply
reasonableness review with teeth to warrantless container searches. 444
At first glance, rational basis review in the equal protection context
seems conceptually distinct from the reasonableness of a search or seizure
in the Fourth Amendment context. Rational basis review focuses on
whether there is a legitimate reason for a particular piece of legislation.
Reasonableness review, in contrast, balances individual versus
governmental interests to decide the propriety of a governmental intrusion
on privacy. Comparing the two, however, is useful because both standards
typically accord great deference to the government. In its equal protection
jurisprudence, the Court has recognized that rational basis review does not
always have to be deferential to the government. I suggest that nondeferential review is even more appropriate in the Fourth Amendment
context given the desire to check executive discretion that led the Framers
to include the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights.
Reasonableness with teeth offers the advantage of flexibility and
attention to context that constitutes one of the strengths of regular
reasonableness review. At the same time, reasonableness with teeth is
better than normal reasonableness review because it is less deferential to the
government. An anti-deference rule is particularly important in the Fourth
Amendment context given the original concerns that motivated the Framers
to include the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights. The Fourth
Amendment was intended to act as a check on executive discretion. More
searching judicial review of police search decisions comports with the
original understanding of the Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, reasonableness with teeth can and should be more
determinate than normal reasonableness review. By spelling out the factors
that lower courts should take into consideration when deciding whether a
given search passes constitutional muster under reasonableness with teeth,
the Court can provide guidance to lower courts and litigants as to when a
particular search passes constitutional muster.
One might object to my proposal on the ground that in the MorenoCleburne-Evans trilogy, the Court was dealing with legislation it felt was
motivated by animus toward a politically unpopular group whereas in the
container search cases, there is no legislation designed to disadvantage the
homeless or the urban poor. The ability to search containers without a
warrant comes from judicial opinions, not legislation, and the
444

The ease with which police officers can obtain search warrants suggests nondeferential reasonableness review might be appropriate even in cases where the police
obtained a search warrant. See Bascuas, supra note 28, at 580 (arguing that a search warrant
“offers little if any protection against government invasions of private property and serves
primarily to obviate adversarial challenge”).
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disproportionate effect that the erosion of the Container Doctrine has on the
homeless and urban poor is simply the unhappy by-product not of animus,
but of court decisions favoring reasonableness over warrants. There is little
evidence to suggest that law enforcement officers who search containers are
intentionally targeting the homeless and the poor.
The Court’s
jurisprudence on container searches simply happens to have the unfortunate
side effect of disproportionately burdening a politically unpopular group.
I have several responses to this objection. First, the fact that the Court
in Moreno-Cleburne-Romer trilogy was reviewing legislation whereas
courts reviewing container searches are reviewing police decisions to search
is a distinction without a difference, at least in this context. In both
instances, a branch of the government—the legislature in the equal
protection arena and the executive in the Fourth Amendment context—is
acting in a way that disproportionately hurts a politically unpopular group.
Because the political process is unlikely to correct itself when nonmajoritarian interests are disadvantaged, extra safeguards must be
implemented to protect the harmed group when it is a politically unpopular
minority. Moreover, one reason for judicial deference to legislatures under
the usual rational basis test is because legislatures enjoy a strong
presumption of legitimacy. 445 Given the history of overreaching which led
the Framers to adopt the Fourth Amendment, courts should not presume
legitimacy when it comes to police decisions to search. 446
Second, the fact that the Moreno-Cleburne-Romer trilogy dealt with
legislative acts that appeared to intentionally discriminate against a
politically unpopular group does not mean reasonableness review with teeth
cannot be applied in the container search context where there is no evidence
that courts or police officers are intentionally discriminating against the
homeless and the poor. The discriminatory intent requirement in equal
protection jurisprudence has been heavily criticized as misguided in light of
overwhelming social science research showing that much of the
discrimination that takes place today is the result of implicit bias, not overt
intentional discrimination. 447
445

Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
See Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of General Suspicionless
Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93, 143 (2007) (arguing that a court should strictly
scrutinize searches and seizures involving excessive executive discretion or the lack of
legislative authorization, which is the case in the run-of-the-mill police search).
447
See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1506–08 (2005);
Jerry Kang & Mazharin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006); Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic
Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 536–41 (2008) (discussing recent social science
research on race and implicit bias). See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
446

2010]

THE DISAPPEARING CONTAINER DOCTRINE

1485

In the container search context, we may not have a government actor
or institution that is intentionally targeting a politically unpopular group,
but that is beside the point. Even if there is no animus or intent to
discriminate, favoring the containers of the wealthy over the containers of
the poor at best reflects indifference; at worst, it indicates a callous
disregard for the rights of the less wealthy and less fortunate. In a society
that prides itself on equal application of the law, we should strive to ensure
that Fourth Amendment protections do not skew in favor of the wealthy
over the poor. Ensuring equal protection of the rich and poor here is
especially important because the Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures is explicitly protected by the
Constitution.
A second possible objection to non-deferential reasonableness review
of warrantless container searches might be that the Court has explicitly
refused to recognize the poor as a suspect class.448 Heightened review, this
argument would continue, is only merited when a suspect or quasi-suspect
class is affected by the challenged governmental action. This is a weak
objection, given that the Court similarly refused to recognize hippies, the
mentally disabled, and gays and lesbians as suspect classes in Moreno,
Cleburne, and Romer, yet applied non-deferential review in these cases. 449
Moreover, support for a heightened standard of review in container
search cases can be found in other equal protection cases in which the Court
struck down legislation that disproportionately burdened the poor. Notably,
in each of these cases, the Court did not require proof of intent to
discriminate against the poor. Moreover, unlike in the container search
cases where the poor are burdened in the exercise of an explicit
constitutional right—the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures—the challenged legislation in each of these cases harmed the poor
in the exercise of rights not explicitly in the Constitution. 450

Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
448
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (noting that the
poor are not a suspect class because they are “not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process”).
449
Romer, 517 U.S. at 624; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 47 U.S. 432, 436–
37 (1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 530, 534–35 (1973).
450
See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665–66 (1966) (right to vote
in state elections not explicitly in the U.S. Constitution); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 630–31 (1969) (right to travel from state to state not explicitly in the Constitution),
overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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For example, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court
struck down Virginia’s poll tax on equal protection grounds. 451 Section 173
of the Virginia Constitution directed the General Assembly to levy an
annual poll tax not exceeding $1.50 on every resident twenty-one years or
older. 452 Section 18 of the Virginia Constitution made payment of poll
taxes a precondition for voting in state elections.453 Even though there is no
explicit constitutional right to vote in state elections, 454 the Court found
Virginia’s poll tax violative of equal protection because it discriminated
against the poor in the exercise of their right of suffrage. 455
Similarly, in Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court struck down statutory
provisions denying welfare benefits to indigents who had not resided in the
state for at least one year on equal protection grounds. 456 The Court held
the durational residency provisions unconstitutional because they infringed
on the poor’s exercise of their constitutional right to travel.457 The Court
acknowledged that the Constitution contains no explicit right to travel, but
suggested such a right is implied in the Privileges and Immunities
Clauses. 458
I am not the first legal scholar to suggest that the Court should borrow
from its equal protection jurisprudence when deciding whether the Fourth
Amendment has been violated. Scott Sundby has argued that the Court’s
reasonableness balancing test should be replaced with a strict scrutiny
standard to reorient the Fourth Amendment back toward protecting privacy
interests. 459 To reconcile the tension between the Warrant Preference and
451

Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.
Id. at 664 n.1.
453
Id.
454
Id. at 665.
455
Id. at 668 (“[T]he interest of the State, when it comes to voting, is limited to the
power to fix qualifications. Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability
to participate intelligently in the electoral process.”).
456
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
457
Id. at 627.
458
Id. at 630 n.8.
459
Sundby, supra note 20, at 431 (“[T]he soundest alternative to the Court’s current
vague balancing test is a single-tiered strict scrutiny standard based on a compelling
government interest-least intrusive means test.”); see also Holly, supra note 21, at 340–41
(arguing that the current reasonableness balancing approach to the Fourth Amendment
should be abandoned and that the Court should return to the warrant requirement and
examine warrantless searches with strict scrutiny); Kevin C. Newsom, Recent Development,
Suspicionless Drug Testing and the Fourth Amendment: Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995), 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 213 (1995) (arguing that
the Court should “replace its freewheeling ‘reasonableness’ analysis with the familiar
standard of strict scrutiny in evaluating government searches”); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth
452
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the Separate Clauses views, Sundby proposes a composite model of the
Fourth Amendment under which initiatory intrusions—intrusions in which
the government initiates the investigative activity in the absence of any
suspicious behavior—are evaluated for reasonableness and responsive or
investigatory intrusions—where the government investigation is based upon
particularized suspicion—are analyzed under the warrant clause.460 Under
Sundby’s proposal, an initiatory intrusion should be deemed reasonable
only if there is a compelling governmental interest and the intrusion is the
least intrusive means to achieve that governmental interest.461 Sundby
argues that a strict scrutiny standard for initiatory intrusions would provide
a more structured reasonableness inquiry than the current balancing test.462
Under Sundby’s proposal, an investigatory intrusion would require a
warrant based on probable cause. 463
Another leading Fourth Amendment scholar, Christopher Slobogin,
has argued that “Fourth Amendment analysis should mimic equal protection
rationality review ‘with bite,’ if not strict scrutiny.” 464 Unlike Sundby who
finds Terry problematic, Slobogin thinks the Court in Terry got it right by
adjusting the amount of justification needed (reasonable suspicion rather
than probable cause) to account for the level of intrusiveness of the seizure
(a brief, investigatory detention rather than a prolonged arrest). Slobogin
argues that Terry’s sliding scale approach should be extended to all
searches and seizures such that courts evaluating the reasonableness of a

Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive
Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1189 (1988) (arguing for a least intrusive
means analysis to inform the reasonableness balancing analysis because “alleged violations
of fourth amendment rights should . . . be subjected to judicial scrutiny which is at least as
strict as that applied to alleged violations of other constitutional rights”). Additionally,
Robert Logan argues that the Court should utilize a variation of its equal protection threetiered standard of review model when it analyzes its special needs cases. Robert S. Logan,
The Reverse Equal Protection Analysis: A New Methodology for “Special Needs” Cases, 68
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 447 (2000). A few student authors have argued that the Court should
apply intermediate scrutiny in certain Fourth Amendment contexts. See, e.g., John P.
Cronan, Note, Subjecting the Fourth Amendment to Intermediate Scrutiny: The
Reasonableness of Media Ride-Alongs, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 949, 959 (1999) (arguing
for intermediate scrutiny of media ride-alongs); John S. Morgan, Comment, The Junking of
the Fourth Amendment: Illinois v. Krull and New York v. Burger, 63 TUL. L. REV. 335, 371
(1988) (arguing for intermediate scrutiny of searches of closely regulated businesses).
460
Sundby, supra note 20, at 418–19.
461
Id. at 431.
462
Id.
463
Id. at 418–19.
464
Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the
Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1089 (1998).
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search or seizure “should demand from the government a specific showing
of need that is proportionate to the invasion.”465
Over the years, various Supreme Court Justices have expressed
support for a sliding scale approach as well. In 1949, for example, Justice
Robert Jackson, dissenting in Brinegar v. United States, argued that if a
child were kidnapped, the police would be justified in setting up a
roadblock and searching every outgoing car without probable cause, even if
they would not be justified in implementing such a roadblock to catch a
bootlegger. 466 More recently, in 2000, Justice O’Connor, writing for the
Court in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, echoed Justice Jackson’s
sentiments, suggesting that the validity of a roadblock might turn on the
purpose for which the roadblock was created:
[T]he Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored
roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or catch a dangerous criminal
who is likely to flee by a particular route. The exigencies created by these scenarios
are far removed from the circumstances under which authorities might simply stop
cars as a matter of course to see if there just happens to be a felon leaving the
jurisdiction. 467

Also in 2000, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority in Florida v.
J.L., suggested that a sliding scale approach to reasonable suspicion might
be appropriate:
The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the circumstances under
which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search
even without a showing of reliability. We do not say, for example, that a report of a
person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a
person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk. Nor
do we hold that public safety officials in quarters where the reasonable expectation of
Fourth Amendment privacy is diminished, such as airports and schools, cannot
conduct protective searches on the basis of information insufficient to justify searches
elsewhere. 468

In his famous Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures on the Fourth
Amendment, Anthony Amsterdam pointed out that the Supreme Court has
already adopted a sliding scale approach in two contexts:

465
Id.; see also CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment
should be read to permit only those surveillance techniques that produce a success rate
roughly proportionate to the intrusion they visit upon those affected and that intrusiveness
should be measured empirically); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth
Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 68–75 (1991).
466
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
467
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
468
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2000) (citations omitted).
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In two cases the Supreme Court has taken just such a sliding scale approach. The first
is Terry v. Ohio, the major stop-and-frisk decision, in which the Court authorized
investigative stops—that is, brief on-the-street detentions accompanied by a frisk or
patdown for weapons—upon less than probable cause for arrest . . . . The second case
is Schmerber v. California, where the Supreme Court said that searches which
breached the body wall (there, the extraction of blood by means of a hypodermic
needle), intruding more upon the “interests in human dignity and privacy” than do
external body searches, require greater justification. Together, Terry and Schmerber
might support a general fourth amendment theory that increasing degrees of
intrusiveness require increasing degrees of justification and increasingly stringent
469
procedures for the establishment of that justification.

Adopting a sliding scale approach could pose a variety of problems.
Anthony Amsterdam notes that a sliding scale approach would likely
“produce more slide than scale”470 and result in the Fourth Amendment
Moreover, if Fourth
becoming an “immense Rorschach blot.” 471
Amendment protections are calibrated to depend on the nature and
seriousness of the alleged offense or threat involved, an innocent individual
might find himself the subject of a warrantless search that is upheld as
reasonable because the officer suspected the individual of acts relating to
terrorism. In this post 9/11 era, an officer might be too quick to assume he
is dealing with a terrorist suspect, which would enable him to search with a
very low level of justification under a sliding scale approach.
Scott Sundby points out that a sliding scale approach could also
decimate the already fragile remains of the warrant requirement:
[A] sliding scale model, placing complete emphasis on the reasonableness clause such
that a reasonableness balancing test would apply to all searches and seizures, also
poses significant problems. The model presents textual difficulties by failing to
provide an independent role for the amendment’s one concrete requirement of a
warrant based on probable cause. Under the sliding-scale model, the Court could
conclude that the fourth amendment never required a warrant based on probable cause
as a prerequisite to a reasonable search or seizure. Although the Court would
probably not adopt such an extreme reading, the mere probability illustrates how the
sliding-scale model fails to account for the warrant clause’s presence in the
amendment’s text. 472

At the other end of the spectrum, Richard Worf uses political process
theory to argue for highly deferential judicial review, akin to rational basis

469

Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 390 (1974).
470
Id. at 394.
471
Id. at 393.
472
Sundby, supra note 20, at 416–17; see also Alschuler, supra note 37, at 263 (“A view
of the fourth amendment that treats probable cause as a unitary standard while authorizing
departures from this standard when police intrusions seem relatively minor effectively makes
warrants unavailable as a means of controlling the lesser or second-tier intrusions.”).
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review, of searches authorized by legislative action.473 Worf starts from the
assumption that a statute should prevail over a judge’s interpretation of that
statute. 474 This is because “the majoritarian decision of the legislature
should ordinarily be preferred to the decisions of unelected and
unaccountable judges.” 475 In Worf’s view, more stringent judicial review is
justified “if, and only if, it has [a] democracy-enhancing effect.” 476 Thus, if
a law burdens a discrete and insular minority, heightened judicial scrutiny
may be necessary to “help to replicate the result that would have been
obtained in a more perfect democracy where everyone is represented.” 477
Worf would recognize five exceptions to his general rule that courts
should defer to the legislature and apply normal rational basis review when
reviewing searches and seizures for constitutionality. He would support
heightened judicial scrutiny when there is: (1) no legislative authorization
for the challenged governmental action, (2) excessive executive discretion,
(3) discrimination against a discrete and insular minority, (4) no rational
basis, or (5) violation of an independent constitutional provision like the
First Amendment. 478 Because the run-of-the-mill Fourth Amendment case
involves an individual police officer’s decision to search or seize,
heightened judicial scrutiny would seem to be appropriate in most Fourth
Amendment cases even under Worf’s scheme. Only in the arena of
administrative searches where the legislature has authorized a broad-based
type of search, such as checkpoints to check for sobriety and immigration
checkpoints to check immigration status, would extremely deferential
rational basis review apply. I am not persuaded that courts should ever
completely defer to legislatures in the Fourth Amendment context, but do
agree with Worf that in the five types of cases Worf identifies as exceptions
to his general rule of judicial deference to the legislature, heightened
judicial scrutiny is appropriate.
Sundby’s composite model may be too complex to provide simple
guidance to the average police officer in the field needing to know in
advance what is required before he can perform a search or seizure and
Slobogin’s sliding scale approach may enable the police to engage in more
warrantless searches and seizures than currently allowed. Nonetheless, I
agree with both Sundby and Slobogin that heightened non-deferential
judicial review of the constitutionality of most governmental searches and
seizures is appropriate. Heightened scrutiny is far superior to the current
473
474
475
476
477
478

See generally Worf, supra note 446.
Id. at 101.
Id.
Id. at 102.
Id.
Id. at 161–62.
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balancing with a thumb-on-the-scale-in-favor-of-the-government that
currently takes place.
Unlike Sundby, Slobogin, and others, I do not argue for a strict
scrutiny standard of review because the Court has already rejected strict
scrutiny in the Fourth Amendment context. The Court has on numerous
occasions stated that the government is not required to use the least
intrusive means available to be in compliance with the Fourth
Amendment. 479 In the administrative search context where there is an
explicit evaluation of the purported governmental interest, the Court does
not require that the governmental interest be “compelling” in the usual
sense of the word in order to comport with the Fourth Amendment. 480
Strict scrutiny may also be overly discretion-constraining. As noted
above, in the equal protection context, whenever government action affects
a suspect class or the exercise of a fundamental right, strict scrutiny is
applied and the challenged regulation is almost always struck down. 481 If
all Fourth Amendment claims are subject to strict scrutiny, either all but a
few government searches would be deemed unreasonable or strict scrutiny
would end up not being very strict. Just as police officers need discretion to
decide what action is appropriate in the field, courts deciding Fourth
Amendment claims need discretion to decide whether the challenged
government action violated the Constitution. While the current balancing
test provides too few constraints on the exercise of the reviewing court’s
discretion, strict scrutiny may provide too many constraints. Something
between a completely deferential rational basis standard and strict scrutiny
is required. Reasonableness with teeth offers the advantage of heightened
judicial scrutiny without the discretion-constraining limitations of strict
scrutiny.

479
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2632 (2010) (“This Court has repeatedly
refused to declare that only the ‘least intrusive’ search practicable can be reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.”) (internal quotation omitted); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
92 of Pottawatomie City v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002) (“[T]his Court has repeatedly
stated that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment does not require employing the least
intrusive means . . . .”); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995) (“We
have repeatedly refused to declare that only the ‘least intrusive’ search practicable can be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983)
(“The reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily or
invariably turn on the existence of alternative ‘less intrusive’ means.”).
480
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995) (“It is a mistake, however, to think that the phrase
‘compelling state interest,’ in the Fourth Amendment context, describes a fixed, minimum
quantum of governmental concern . . . . Rather, the phrase describes an interest that appears
important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors that show
the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy.”).
481
See supra Part V.B
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In proposing reasonableness with teeth, I do not suggest that the Court
simply adopt wholesale the “rational basis with bite” standard that it has
utilized in a minority of its equal protection cases. The problem with
borrowing from the Court’s rational basis with bite jurisprudence is that the
Court has provided little guidance regarding when rational basis with bite is
appropriate and virtually no guidance with respect to what rational basis
with bite means besides heightened judicial scrutiny of the challenged
governmental action.482 Moreover, the Court applies deferential rational
basis review in most equal protection cases and applies rational basis with
bite in only a small minority of cases. 483
Reasonableness with teeth in the Fourth Amendment context does not
have to suffer from these same flaws. First, it is unnecessary to limit
reasonableness review with teeth to cases in which a politically unpopular
group has been disadvantaged. Non-deferential reasonableness review
should apply to all container searches, not simply those implicating the poor
and the homeless. Since the Fourth Amendment requires that all searches
and seizures be reasonable, not simply those directed at politically
unpopular groups, reasonableness is already required for all searches and
seizures. The only question is what form reasonableness review ought to
take. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires that reasonableness
review be ultra-deferential. Indeed, given the reasons why the Fourth
Amendment was included in the Bill of Rights—the desire to constrain
arbitrary and exploratory governmental searches and seizures—a nondeferential standard of review is more appropriate than deferential, progovernment review.

482
See Pettinga, supra note 439, at 801 (arguing that because the Court has not
articulated the factors that trigger rational basis with bite, it can apply heightened scrutiny
whenever it chooses); Smith, supra note 439, at 2785 (noting that rational basis with bite has
led to confusion in the lower courts with federal courts continuing to apply normal rational
basis review and state courts more willing to apply rational basis with bite). The Court’s
rational basis with bite jurisprudence is even more unsatisfying given its lack of “a
harmonious principle obtainable from within the internal logic of the cases themselves.”
Farrell, supra note 435, at 414. Gerald Gunther suggested that the rational basis with bite
cases decided during the Court’s 1971 term might be explained by the Court’s focus on the
means used by the government to achieve its ends. Gunther, supra note 434, at 21 (noting
that under rational basis with bite, the challenged legislation passed constitutional muster as
long as the means substantially furthered the legislative purpose whereas under strict
scrutiny, the focus was on whether the government’s ends were compelling). In contrast,
when the Court applies strict scrutiny, it focuses on the government’s objectives or ends. Id.
In subsequent terms, however, the Court’s rational basis with bite cases have sometimes
focused on the governmental ends and means and sometimes just on the governmental ends.
Farrell, supra note 435, at 414–15.
483
Farrell, supra note 435.
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Second, the factors relevant to whether a search should be deemed
reasonable can and should be spelled out in advance, diminishing the
problems of vagueness and lack of guidance that plague the current
reasonableness balancing test in the Fourth Amendment.484 The Court can
provide guidance to lower courts by specifying which factors lower courts
should consider when conducting reasonableness review with teeth. 485
Even if the Court does not provide lower courts with a list of relevant
factors, the process of appellate decisionmaking can help bring determinacy
to this area. Each time the Court decides a container search case using
reasonableness with teeth, it will set precedent regarding what is or is not
reasonable. To a certain extent, this is already being done in the
administrative search context. The Supreme Court has made clear that
sobriety checkpoints are reasonable,486 while checkpoints for narcotics
interdiction are not reasonable.487 It has held that drug testing of high
school athletes is reasonable, 488 while drug testing of political candidates is
not reasonable. 489 And it is not just the Supreme Court that can provide
guidance as to which kinds of searches are reasonable. The appellate courts
can play a role here as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
In requiring police to get a warrant before searching a container, the
Container Doctrine put containers on an equal footing with houses. It also
484

See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004
UTAH L. REV. 977, 1026 (“[A]bsent objective criteria for measuring reasonableness,
progressively intrusive actions have been and will continue to be allowed”). Spelling out the
factors that reviewing courts ought to consider when applying non-deferential
reasonableness with teeth review is beyond the scope of this article. I plan to address this in
a future article.
485
See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 126, at 1491 (listing factors that a reviewing court could
consider when assessing a search for reasonableness); Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of
Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U.
MEM. L. REV. 483 (1995) (arguing that individualized suspicion should be a necessary
component of reasonableness); Colb, supra note 38 (arguing that a strong showing of
probable cause should be a prerequisite to a finding of reasonableness). But see Arcila,
supra note 309, at 1224 (arguing against an individualized suspicion requirement in the
administrative search context).
486
Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding sobriety checkpoints).
487
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (striking down checkpoints to check for
narcotics).
488
Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie City v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822
(2002) (upholding random drug testing of high school students participating in
extracurricular activities); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding
random drug testing of high school athletes).
489
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (striking down random drug testing of
candidates for political office).
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reflected the Court’s preference for warrants. Over the past several
decades, the Court has gradually moved away from requiring warrants in
most container search cases to permitting warrantless container searches.
The erosion of the Container Doctrine mirrors the Court’s embrace of
reasonableness over warrants. Reasonableness review is problematic both
because it is indeterminate and because it is highly deferential to the
government. The erosion of the Container Doctrine is also problematic
because it disproportionately harms the homeless and the urban poor.
It does not appear that the current Court is likely to go back to a strong
embrace of the Warrant Preference view anytime soon. Given this reality, I
suggest borrowing from a slice of the Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence and importing the concept of rational basis with bite into the
Fourth Amendment context. When evaluating the reasonableness of a
search or seizure—governmental action that has by definition intruded upon
a reasonable expectation of privacy or possessory interests—reasonableness
review should have some non-deferential teeth.

